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401 
JUDICIAL LOBBYING 
J. Jonas Anderson
*
 
Abstract: Judges who lobby Congress for legal reform tread into an ethical gray area: 
lobbying is legally permissible, but generally frowned upon. Currently, there are no legal or 
ethical constraints on judges speaking publicly regarding proposed legislative changes, only 
an ill-defined norm against the practice. Scholars have largely dismissed judicial lobbying 
efforts as the result of haphazard, one-off events, driven by the unique interests, expertise, or 
ideology of the individual judge involved. According to scholars, there is nothing that should 
be done—not to mention little that could be done—to restrict judges from lobbying. 
Judicial lobbying occurs, in large part, when Congress proposes jurisdictional changes: 
judges lobby when the scope of their review may change. Yet, jurisdictional issues raise 
concerns about the judiciary’s biases when it comes to lobbying. To further explore this 
point, this Article explores the case of specialized courts’ involvement in legislative lobbying 
efforts. Specialized courts have more opportunities to lobby Congress on jurisdiction because 
any legislative change to the subject matter under the specialized court’s purview is likely to 
alter the court’s jurisdiction. 
This Article argues that in certain instances lobbying by specialized judges ought to be 
curtailed. Lobbying by specialized courts raises unique issues that may not be present when 
judges on generalized courts lobby. Namely, specialized court lobbying may sacrifice long-
held judicial virtues, including due process and impartiality, virtues which are fundamental to 
the legitimacy of the judiciary. This Article examines potential solutions to check such 
lobbying, and offers a partial solution that leverages the wisdom of the judicial branch, as a 
whole, to minimize those concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, federal district judge John Bates wrote three unsolicited 
letters to Congress opposing the USA FREEDOM Act.
1
 The Act would 
have imposed new limits on the U.S. government’s ability to monitor 
email and phone communications of American citizens.
2
 In Judge 
Bates’s view, the USA Freedom Act suffered from three fundamental 
problems: it would have limited the government’s ability to “pursue 
potentially valuable intelligence-gathering activities,”3 it would have 
                                                     
1. Letter from John Bates, Chief Judge, FISA Court, to Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, Senate 
Comm. on Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2014); Letter from John Bates, Chief Judge, FISA Court, to Mike 
Rogers, Chairman, Permanent Senate Comm. on Intelligence (May 13, 2014); Letter from John 
Bates, Chief Judge, FISA Court, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Aug. 
5, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Leahyletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P6H-
TDPG]. 
2. USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). The distinctly modified USA 
Freedom Act was passed in June 2015. USA FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 
(2015). The new act renews all provisions of the Patriot Act, except for the mass collection of data 
under § 215. See Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Surveillance in Place Since 9/11 Is 
Sharply Limited, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 2, 2015, at A1. 
3. Letter from John Bates to Patrick Leahy, supra note 1. 
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needlessly complicated the work of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISA Court),
4
 and it was “potentially unconstitutional.”5 The 
propriety of Judge Bates’s efforts to persuade Congress was 
controversial, challenged by both academic commentators and federal 
judges.
6
 Controversy swirled around the fact that, at the time Judge 
Bates urged Congress to kill the USA Freedom Act, he was the 
Presiding Judge of the FISA court—the court given responsibility for 
enforcing the law.
7
 Judge Bates was expressing his views on the 
substantive merits of a bill, before a case challenging that bill had been 
filed.
8
 However, such “lobbying” of Congress by Federal judges is 
permitted, although traditionally it has been disfavored.
9
 
The tension inherent with judges lobbying for or against bills that 
they will eventually interpret has not been overlooked by academics.
10
 
                                                     
4. Id. at 4–5 (arguing that it would impede the courts’ ability “to complete their work in a timely 
fashion”). 
5. Id. 
6. For example, the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit wrote to Congress expressing his 
disapproval of Judge Bates’s actions. Letter from Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://images.politico.com/global/2014/08/20/kozinski_to_leahy.html [https://perma.cc/XZ9G-
5NEM]. 
7. Stephen I. Vladeck, Judge Bates (Unintentionally) Makes the Case for FISC Reform, JUST 
SECURITY BLOG (July 22, 2015, 2:57 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org [https://perma.cc/YC86-
QJX7]; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case for a FISA “Special Advocate,” 2 TEX. A&M L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 17–18) (detailing Judge Bates’s criticism of the special 
advocate). 
8. Just such a challenge was brought three days after the bill was signed. Motion in Opposition to 
the Government’s Imminent or Recently-Made Request to Resume Bulk Data Collection Under 
Patriot Act § 215, Kucinelli v. Obama, No. 15-01 (FISA Ct. June 5, 2015). 
9. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 82, 97 (1968) (“Federal judicial power is limited to those 
disputes which confine federal courts to a rule consistent with a system of separated powers and 
which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.”). 
10. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 181–82 (1964) 
(examining limits on judicial speech); Charles G. Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: 
Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1241–48 (1996) 
(proposing ways to enable judicial lobbying); Neal K. Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1709, 1723–53 (1998) (arguing for a role (both historic and contemporary) for judges as 
“advicegivers”); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, The Extra-Judicial Activities of Supreme Court Justices: 
Where Should the Line Be Drawn?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 494 (1983) (reviewing BRUCE A. MURPHY, 
AN INQUIRY STIMULATED BY THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION—THE SECRET 
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1982)); Christopher E. Smith, Judicial 
Lobbying and Court Reform: U.S. Magistrate Judges and the Improvements Act of 1990, 14 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 163, 189–91 (1991) (detailing judicial lobbying efforts). While the topic 
of individual courts and lobbying has been canvassed, less work has been done on the broader 
question of which courts lobby and why. See, e.g., Roger E. Hartley, “It’s Called Lunch”: Judicial 
Ethics and the Political and Legal Space for the Judiciary to “Lobby,” 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 386 
(2014) (“[T]here has been relatively little scholarship on how courts do intergovernmental relations 
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Judicial lobbying can be viewed as merely a way for the judicial branch 
to communicate with Congress, part of the long history of dialogue 
between Congress and the courts.
11
 Ever since Alexander Bickel’s 
groundbreaking work on the dialogic nature of the court-Congress 
relationship, scholars have exhaustively examined the ways that judges 
influence congressional law-making.
12
 In this vein, scholars have 
identified a host of ways in which judges engage in constitutional 
dialogue with Congress: by declaring statutes unconstitutional, by 
interpreting statutory language, and by exercising what Bickel called 
“the passive virtues” that enable courts to avoid deciding constitutional 
questions.
13
 
But a dialogic account of judicial lobbying must account for the fact 
that, in certain instances, judges urging a certain action by Congress may 
sacrifice any judicial claim of neutrality.
14
 Judge Bates’s recent actions 
serve as a cautionary tale demonstrating the pitfalls inherent with 
judicial lobbying.
15
 But the phenomenon of judges lobbying Congress is 
not unique to Judge Bates. For instance, in 2010, while Congress was 
debating significant reforms to the U.S. patent system, Chief Judge 
                                                     
work . . . .”); John W. Winkle III, Interbranch Politics: The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
as Liaison, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 43, 43 (2003) (“Lobbying by the judiciary and its intermediaries 
remains a topic of low salience on research agendas.”). 
11. See generally Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and 
Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (analyzing Congress’s and the Supreme Court’s 
respective powers when it comes to federal jurisdiction); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress 
to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953) 
(discussing the congressional power to limit jurisdiction); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537 (1997) (debating Congress’s and courts’ relative 
powers); Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Why the Debate over Congress’ Power to Restrict the 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 1311 (1983) (discussing the unending 
debate about courts’ power to determine jurisdiction); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the 
Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965) (discussing the relative power of the courts and 
Congress). 
12. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 186 
n.10 (1981) (developing an approach for reconciling judicial review and democracy); J. HARVIE 
WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR 
INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 5–17 (2012) (arguing against a comprehensive 
constitutional theory); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1, 3–10 (1971) (defending originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation as a means 
of defining the proper role for unelected judges in a democratic system). 
13. The “passive virtues” receive a thorough treatment in Bickel’s work. See, e.g., Alexander M. 
Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42–47 (1961) (discussing the different 
matters in which the courts avoid constitutional questions).  
14. See Jon O. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE 
L.J. 1643, 1649–52 (1985) (discussing obstacles to achieving judicial fairness and balance). 
15. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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Michel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit wrote to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, urging Congress to eliminate various 
aspects of the pending legislation.
16
 Chief Judge Michel was arguing that 
Congress need not act; instead, Chief Judge Michel suggested that his 
court could handle the heavy lifting of reforming the patent system.
17
 
Like Judge Bates, Chief Judge Michel was lobbying Congress about a 
law that had yet to be enacted, but would have been reviewed by his 
court if enacted. 
The reality that active judges often lobby Congress on legislation 
which will be interpreted by their courts raises three primary 
constitutional and ethical questions. First, do judicial lobbying efforts 
impinge upon the Constitution’s separation of powers? Second, to what 
degree do judicial lobbying efforts violate judicial ethics, both formal 
and informal? Third, does judicial lobbying undermine fairness and 
equity in the administration of justice? 
As to the first question, there are sound reasons to think that the 
Constitution does not preclude judicial lobbying. Despite the 
Constitution’s delegation of separate powers to the legislature and the 
judiciary, the branches do not persist in what Benjamin Cardozo called 
“proud and silent isolation.”18 For example, lobbying does not appear to 
involve any use of the “legislative power” that is reserved for Congress 
alone; lobbying is not the power to legislate
19
 Furthermore, although 
lobbying is likely outside the scope of Article III’s judicial power, 
individual judges can engage with legislation outside of their court 
duties.
20
 
The second question—concerning the formal ethical limits on judicial 
lobbying—is more difficult to answer. There is active disagreement 
about the extent to which the Code of Conduct for United States Judges 
curtails judges’ ability to lobby Congress.21 Despite this debate, the 
                                                     
16. See J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1069–76 (2014) (describing in 
detail Chief Judge Michel’s actions). 
17. Id.; see also J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917 (2011) 
(discussing courts and patent reform). 
18. Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 114 (1921). 
19. See Geyh, supra note 10, at 1193 (“When judges propose, draft, testify on, and lobby for or 
against legislative reform, they do not usurp a legislative power that the Constitution vests in 
Congress alone.”). 
20. See, e.g., Maeva Marcus & Emily F. Van Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the New Federal 
System, 1789-1800, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 41–42 (Robert 
A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (distinguishing permissible individual consultations between Congress and 
judges with impermissible institutional pronouncements on pending legislation). 
21. See infra Section III.B. 
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Judicial Conference has interpreted the limits on judicial lobbying quite 
liberally, resulting in few formal ethical restrictions on the practice.
22
 
Informally, however, judges have developed strong norms against 
lobbying on issues that do not directly touch on the practice of judging, 
norms that are often flouted in practice.
23
 
As for the last question, when judges lobby they run the risk of 
sacrificing the neutrality and even-handedness that is critical for the 
judicial branch’s legitimacy.24 Federal judges who comment on policy 
matters invariably run the risk of prejudicing, or appearing to prejudice, 
future cases.
25
 Thus, additional checks on the excesses of judicial 
lobbying ought to be established. Any such checks, however, should not 
silence judicial voices on policy. Judicial input is often an invaluable 
insight into the administration of proposed laws.
26
 Judges often represent 
unbiased, informed opinions, as demonstrated by the frequency with 
which lawmakers adopt judicial suggestions on legislative matters.
27
 
Furthermore, absolute limits on judicial lobbying would likely violate 
the First Amendment.
28
 A more surgical approach is required. 
Towards that end, this Article examines ways to oversee lobbying 
efforts, particularly by specialized courts. Specialized courts are 
particularly influenced by repeat litigants and can suffer from tunnel 
vision on policy matters, vulnerabilities that are exacerbated when 
judges lobby.
29
 Specialized courts may be more incentivized to lobby for 
policy changes because the administrative impacts of legislative policy 
changes are greater for specialized courts than they are for courts of 
general jurisdiction.
30
 This phenomenon is well illustrated by Judge 
                                                     
22. Id. 
23. See infra Section II.C. 
24. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of 
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643 (1992) (debating the myriad ways in which judicial review 
of political fairness can be categorized). 
25. Justice Harry Blackmun wrote, “[t]he legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on 
its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 
(1989).  
26. See Smith, supra note 10, at 190 (“Congress is especially receptive to communication from 
judicial officers when the judges appear to speak with a unified voice.”). 
27. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT 
ADMINISTRATION 38–39 (1995) (concluding that “Congressional deference” to judicial thoughts on 
legislation can be explained by a lack of knowledge and interest in court administration). 
28. See J. Clark Kelso, Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions on Extrajudicial Speech by Judges, 
28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 851, 851–55 (1995) (applying the First Amendment to judicial speech). 
29. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 380 (discussing 
capture of specialized courts). 
30. See id. at 381 (stating that specialized courts’ jurisdiction, combined with their isolation, put 
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Bates, a generalist federal district judge who lobbied Congress only after 
appointment to a specialized court.
31
 
Judges have traditionally been involved in congressional debates 
about court jurisdiction and reform.
32
 For specialized courts, the 
traditional division between lobbying on judicial reform measures and 
lobbying on general policy reform measures is meaningless; substantive 
legal change inevitably impacts the administration of specialized 
courts.
33
 Specialization blurs the already amorphous boundary between 
substantive and procedural legislative changes: for specialized courts 
policy and jurisdiction are essentially indistinguishable.
34
 Thus, to the 
degree one is troubled by judicial lobbying, specialized courts represent 
an important focus for any reform proposal. 
This Article’s argument proceeds in four parts. Part I frames the 
inquiry by briefly describing scholarly approaches to court-Congress 
dialogue, of which lobbying plays a significant, if underappreciated role. 
Part II illustrates that judges engage in lobbying on substantive policy 
issues. This Part also examines the case of specialized courts as lobbyists 
to better understand the phenomenon. 
Part III explores the practical and theoretical limits on federal judges 
who attempt to influence legislators. It examines possible Constitutional, 
statutory, and formal ethical restrictions on the practice, as well as 
informal norms. Ultimately, the primary restrictions on judicial lobbying 
are practical in nature: judges are commonly thought to be free to lobby 
about issues impacting the judiciary, but are discouraged from lobbying 
about general policy issues out of respect for the legislature. 
Part IV turns to the central normative and theoretical issues 
underlying judicial lobbying. First, this Part theorizes specialized courts’ 
interest in lobbying. Second, it asks the fundamental questions of 
whether we should be concerned with judicial lobbying, and if so, how 
we should reduce the amount of lobbying that judges undertake. After 
analyzing various arguments for regulating judicial lobbying, this Part 
concludes that judicial lobbying on policy matters can be problematic for 
the effective administration of justice. It suggests various ways to 
                                                     
them at risk of group-think). 
31. One will note that his contemporaries on the court had an opposite reaction; they lobbied that 
the bill imposed constructive boundaries on the FISA Court. See infra Section II.B.3.b. 
32. See Geyh, supra note 10, at 1187–91 (discussing the judiciary’s elevated role in procedural 
reform). 
33. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 1090–93 (analyzing how the Federal Circuit was impacted by 
patent reform). 
34. Id. 
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improve oversight of judicial lobbying. 
I.  THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY AND LIMITS 
ON JUDICIAL LOBBYING 
Modern constitutional scholarship has paid particular attention to 
resolving the tension between democracy and judicial review.
35
 The so-
called “counter-majoritarian difficulty” has spawned numerous books 
and articles attempting to reconcile the reality of unelected judges 
reviewing, and at times invalidating, democratically-created 
legislation.
36
 Scholars have looked for means by which judges can 
reduce the tension created by undemocratic judicial review.
37
 One of the 
most well-known solutions is Alexander Bickel’s suggestion that courts 
employ the “passive virtues” of judicial reasoning38—refusing to decide 
cases on substantive grounds if narrower grounds for a decision exist. 
Scholars have also identified a host of ways in which judges engage in 
constitutional “dialogue” with Congress: by declaring statutes 
unconstitutional, by interpreting statutory language, and by exercising 
“the passive virtues” that enable courts to avoid deciding constitutional 
questions.
39
 These scholarly attempts to decipher the contours of the 
judicial-legislative relationship have focused almost exclusively on 
formal interactions: dialogue via official duties.
40
 In other words, 
scholars have focused on the dialogue that occurs when judges judge and 
when legislators legislate. 
Some scholars, though, have studied the informal channels of 
                                                     
35. Katyal, supra note 10, at 1709 (“Contemporary constitutional law is preoccupied with the 
antidemocratic nature of judicial review.”). 
36. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 12, at 186 (developing an approach for reconciling judicial review 
and democracy); WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 17–28 (arguing against a comprehensive 
constitutional theory); Bork, supra note 12, at 3–10 (defending originalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation as a means of defining the proper role for unelected judges in a 
democratic system). 
37. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 12, at 186 (developing an approach for reconciling judicial review 
and democracy); WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 17–28 (arguing against a comprehensive 
constitutional theory); Bork, supra note 12, at 3–10 (defending originalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation as a means of defining the proper role for unelected judges in a 
democratic system). 
38. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 111 (2d ed. 1986). 
39. Id. 
40. See, e.g., Hartley, supra note 10, at 386 (noting that “there has been relatively little 
scholarship” on courts lobbying); John W. Winkle III, Judges as Lobbyists: Habeas Corpus Reform 
in the 1940s, 68 JUDICATURE 263, 263 (1985) (“Judicial influence outside of adjudication, however, 
is an understudied but nonetheless important phenomenon.”). 
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communication between the branches.
41
 The study of “extrajudicial” 
speech by judges and the restrictions on such speech have greatly 
enhanced understanding of judicial-congressional dialogue.
42
 Generally, 
scholars have concluded that judicial lobbying is unsightly.
43
 Walter 
Murphy, a scholar of the judicial role, has said that lobbying “is contrary 
to the public image of a judge.”44 Judicial lobbying, it is thought, is only 
appropriate when an issue is “of such gravity” that it demands judicial 
intervention.
45
 Taking this view, judges are thought to lobby on issues of 
particular interest to the judiciary. Thus, commentators have looked 
approvingly upon judicial lobbying efforts in areas such as lower court 
reorganization proposals,
46
 the use of magistrate judges,
47
 and judicial 
salary increases.
48
 Judicial lobbying is perceived by most scholars to be 
both reasonable and rare, with judges appropriately lobbying about 
judicial administration while refraining from commenting on more 
general legislative policy. Judges are thought to lobby Congress over 
issues that directly impact the performance of the judiciary’s duties, and 
no others.
49
 
But this perception of judicial lobbying is far from complete. Judges 
routinely testify before Congress about matters related to pending 
                                                     
41. There have been some treatments of particular lobbying efforts, including Judith Resnik, The 
Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 
S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 287–90 (2000) (examining Chief Justice Rehnquist’s involvement in the 
Violence Against Women Act). Some work has been done on the institutions that the judiciary 
employs to perform lobbying. See Winkle, supra note 10, at 50 (detailing the Administrative Office 
of the U.S. Courts’ role in judicial lobbying). 
42. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT 
ADMINISTRATION 131 (1995) (concluding that judges are “well positioned” to shape legislation that 
“will affect court administration”); Geyh, supra note 10, at 1168, 1234–49 (detailing the judiciary’s 
role in statutory reform and rulemaking); Kelso, supra note 28, at 851–55 (describing extrajudicial 
speech); Katyal, supra note 10, at 1711 (arguing that “advicegiving” to Congress is a role embraced 
by judges). 
43. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 1711; Winkle, supra note 40, at 272–73 (detailing the role 
judges played in “court reform”). 
44. MURPHY, supra note 10, at 178. 
45. Id. at 179. 
46. SMITH, supra note 42, at 18 (citing judicial lobbying for the creation of the Eleventh Circuit 
as an example of “tremendous influence” that judges can wield over the court reform process). 
47. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 10, at 164–67 (describing judicial officers attempt to influence the 
legislative branch). 
48. See, e.g., id. at 173. 
49. Cf. Kelso, supra note 28, at 863 (arguing for restrictions on judicial speech); William G. 
Ross, Extrajudicial Speech: Charting the Boundaries of Propriety, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 
623–24 (1989) (proposing limits on extra-judicial speech). 
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legislation.
50
 They also, at times, reach out to Congress in their 
individual capacities to urge Congress to act in a particular policy area.
51
 
In fact, lobbying is such an institutionalized practice of the federal 
judiciary that an entire organization, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, exists with the explicit goal of lobbying for judicial 
interests.
52
 Indeed, judges often lobby Congress over policy issues that 
have merely tangential, if any, impact on the judiciary.
53
 This calls into 
question the value that this more informal dialogue—judges opining on 
potential legislation—has on judicial-congressional relations. If the 
neutrality of the judiciary is sacrificed through lobbying, should judges 
be restrained from lobbying members of Congress? 
At this point, a definition of what constitutes lobbying is appropriate. 
“Lobbying” can be a broad concept that encompasses any actions 
intended to influence decisions made by government officials.
54
 
However, this Article adopts a narrower view of what constitutes 
lobbying activities. First, this Article focuses only on lobbying activities 
by judges outside of their official duties of deciding cases. Judges 
frequently write opinions that are meant to influence legislators, but such 
official dialogue has been well-chronicled in the legal and political 
science literature.
55
 Second, it considers only uninvited lobbying efforts. 
Oftentimes judges are requested by Congress to provide input on a 
particular policy debate, whether through congressional testimony, 
written statements, or other forms of communication.
56
 Conversely, this 
Article is focused on what motivates judges to spontaneously engage in 
                                                     
50. See infra Part II. 
51. For example, judges from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit actively lobbied 
Congress to split the old Fifth Circuit into two. See DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, 
A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
REFORM, (1988). 
52. See Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, Funding the Federal Judiciary: The 
Congressional Connection, 69 JUDICATURE 45, 47 (1986) (describing the role of the Judicial 
Conference). 
53. See infra Part II. 
54. This discussion relies generally on DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 
(1951). 
55. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 1727–1800 (listing instances in which judges give advice to the 
legislature); J. Jonas Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 
AM. U. L. REV. 961, 981–1004 (2014) (detailing how the Federal Circuit interacted with Congress 
regarding patents through its opinions). 
56. See Harvey Rishikof & Barbara A. Perry, “Separateness but Interdependence, Autonomy but 
Reciprocity”: A First Look at Federal Judges’ Appearances Before Legislative Committees, 46 
MERCER L. REV. 667, 669–75 (1995) (finding that Congress nearly always took the advice of judges 
when lobbying on issues of judicial functioning). 
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policy debates outside of their official capacities; thus, invitations to 
address Congress are less relevant to that discussion. This rather narrow 
definition of lobbying limits that term to a judge’s unsolicited views 
about pending legislative action which occurs outside of his or her role 
as judicial decision-maker. 
A. Constitutional and Statutory Limits on Judicial Lobbying 
This section examines the restrictions on judicial lobbying by 
examining potential constitutional, statutory, ethical, and norms-based 
restraints on judges speaking about legislation. Ultimately, it concludes 
that there are no legal restrictions, just a judicial norm against the 
practice. This freedom can be a good thing, providing breathing room 
for constructive dialogue. But the lack of formal restrictions can lead to 
lobbying that threatens judicial neutrality. 
One of the most commonly invoked arguments against judges 
attempting to influence legislation is that such judicial lobbying efforts 
violate constitutional principles of separation of powers.
57
 There is no 
explicit separation of powers clause within the Constitution, rather the 
separation is implied within the Constitution’s structure.58 The first three 
articles of the Constitution vest “all” legislative powers with Congress, 
“the executive [p]ower” in the President, and “the judicial [p]ower” with 
the courts.
59
 Scholars have debated the limits placed on each branch by 
the separation of powers, developing a rich and extremely thorough 
literature on the topic.
60
 
Regardless of one’s viewpoint on the separation of powers, there are 
at least two sound reasons to think that the Constitution does not 
preclude judicial lobbying. First, discussing legislation with members of 
Congress—in an official capacity or otherwise—does not involve any 
use of the “legislative power.”61 Courts and judges do not impinge upon 
                                                     
57. See Geyh, supra note 10, at 1192 (“The separation of powers is often identified as an 
impediment to interbranch cooperation in legislative reform.”). 
58. See, e.g., Malcolm P. Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of “The Separation of 
Powers,” 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385, 395–99 (1935) (describing the doctrine as part of the fabric of 
American society). 
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1. 
60. The literature is too immense to summarize. As a more recent example of the kinds of 
separation of powers concerns that are inviting to scholars, see generally Neal K. Katyal, Internal 
Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 100 
(2006) (questioning whether the executive branch should be regulated from within). 
61. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1; Geyh, supra note 10, at 1193 (“When judges propose, draft, 
testify on, and lobby for or against legislative reform, they do not usurp a legislative power that the 
Constitution vests in Congress alone.”). 
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the legislature’s delegated power when they publically announce their 
views on public policy.
62
 They, like other members of the public, are 
merely seeking to influence Congress in its law-making role.
63
 Such 
attempts to influence do not usurp the legislative branch’s designated 
role.
64
 
Second, Article III of the Constitution does not forbid judges from 
engaging with legislation outside of their duties as a judge. The 
executive and legislative branches regularly comment on and critique the 
work of the judicial branch; the President and Congress often suggest 
that the Supreme Court should decide important cases in particular 
ways.
65
 In fact, the executive branch is a regular litigant in federal court, 
not only as a defendant but often as a plaintiff.
66
 Scholars have suggested 
that Congress is not restricted in using the courts and should engage 
more directly with the judicial branch in court.
67
 While engaging with 
the judicial branch is not a constitutional requirement, it certainly does 
not violate the separation of powers for Congress to do so.
68
 In the same 
way, judges do not violate their constitutionally-granted duties by 
engaging with the legislature outside of official duties. 
The absence of constitutional restrictions on judicial lobbying does 
not end the inquiry into the legal limits of the practice, however.
69
 18 
U.S.C. § 1913 forbids government employees from lobbying Congress 
using “money appropriated by any enactment of Congress.”70 On first 
glance, this would appear to preclude judicial lobbying because judges 
are clearly governmental employees. There are two exceptions to this 
prohibition, however, which greatly remove any barriers for Article III 
judges who wish to lobby Congress. The first of these exceptions 
permits government employees to engage with Congress if a member of 
                                                     
62. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 678–83 (1993) 
(addressing the separation of powers conflict that arises when judges lobby Congress). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Checks on the Judiciary, in CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE 
COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY IN LAWMAKING 21, 21–28 (Colton C. 
Campbell & John F. Stack, Jr. eds., 2002). 
66. See Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 917 (2012) (“As matters stand 
today, however, the executive branch plays the dominant role in federal litigation.”). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 20, at 41–42 (distinguishing permissible individual 
consultations between Congress and judges with impermissible institutional pronouncements on 
pending legislation). 
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (2012). 
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Congress requests advice.
71
 Thus, any congressional request for input 
from a particular judge, court, or the entire judicial branch frees judges 
to respond to the request. In fact, the Judicial Conference strictly adheres 
to this first exception, communicating with Congress only when 
requested to do so by a member of Congress.
72
 
The second exception to the limitation on government employee 
lobbying is the “proper official channels” exception.73 For legislation 
that is deemed “necessary for the efficient conduct of the public 
business,” governmental employees may lobby Congress only via 
“proper official channels.”74 On its face, this exception appears to limit 
judicial lobbying to activities carried out by the Judicial Conference—
the formal lobbying arm of the judiciary—and then only on court-
specific matters that are necessary for the efficient administration of 
justice. As noted above, the Judicial Conference rarely invokes this 
exception, however, choosing instead to wait for Congress to solicit the 
judiciary’s input on legislation.75 
Despite the apparent restrictions of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the Comptroller 
General (C.G.) of the United States has interpreted the statute’s 
exceptions quite broadly. The C.G. has ruled that judicial 
communications with Congress always fall within the “official channels” 
exception because individual Article III judges have no direct supervisor 
and are “arguably” their own “agency spokesperson.”76 Thus, according 
to the C.G., individual judges are limited in lobbying Congress only 
insofar as the issues to which they address their efforts “would have an 
impact on the judiciary.”77 Thus, according to the C.G., in nearly every 
imaginable case, judicial lobbying is not subject to statutory limitation.
78
 
Every potential policy issue has an “impact,” no matter how small, on 
the judiciary. Thus, in practice, judges are only limited to lobbying on 
                                                     
71. Id. 
72. Geyh, supra note 10, at 1196 (critiquing the Judicial Conference’s “utterly unnecessary” 
requirement to participate in the legislative process only when invited to do so). 
73. For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see Smith, supra note 10, at 167–70. 
74. Geyh, supra note 10, at 1195 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1913). 
75. See Resnik, supra note 41, at 278–82 (reciting the history of the Judicial Conference’s 
reluctance to comment on pending legislation absent a directive from Congress). 
76. See Letter from Comptroller Gen. of the U.S. to Jeremiah Denton, Senator (Sept. 26, 1984), in 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 63 DECISIONS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED 
STATES 626 (1985) [hereinafter Letter to Jeremiah Denton]. 
77. Id. 
78. See Smith, supra note 10, at 169 (stating that the interpretation of the rule allows courts and 
Congress to communicate “without narrowly construing the requirement that such communications 
pass through ‘official channels’”). 
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issues that would “impact . . . the judiciary”: a threshold that is easily 
met in virtually every case.
79
 
B. Formal Ethical Limits on Judicial Lobbying 
The behavior of federal judges is regulated not only by constitutional 
and statutory limitations, but also by formal ethical rules. In 1973, the 
Federal Judicial Conference adopted a Code of Conduct for United 
States Judges (“Judicial Code of Conduct”).80 Although the Judicial 
Code of Conduct is non-binding, it is widely followed and regularly 
consulted by the Judicial Conference when determining whether a judge 
has violated his or her ethical obligations and when determining whether 
to institute corrective measures.
81
 
Canon 2 of the Judicial Code of Conduct states that judges should 
“act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”82 This general provision 
provides a standard for judicial lobbying activities, but it does not 
provide specific limits on such activities. Similarly, Canon 3 of the 
Judicial Code of Conduct provides that a “judge should not make public 
comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court.”83 
Judge Calebresi of the Second Circuit recently drew criticism when he 
commented publically that it “would be too bad” if the Supreme Court 
reversed his decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway,
84
 a case examining 
whether a prayer prior to a city meeting violated the Establishment 
Clause.
85
 If a judge were to comment publically on a pending case while 
lobbying Congress, he would be in clear violation of Canon 3 of the 
Judicial Code of Conduct. 
Canons 2 and 3 of the Judicial Code of Conduct set out the basic 
scope of judicial ethical limits on extrajudicial speech. But they are 
                                                     
79. See Letter to Jeremiah Denton, supra note 76, at 626. 
80. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES 
(2009). 
81. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL 
COURTS (2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Judicial-Conduct-and-Discipline--
English--2.19.14.pdf/$file/Judicial-Conduct-and-Discipline--English--2.19.14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5SNR-BKRS]. 
82. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol 2.: Ethics and Judicial 
Conduct, ch. 2, Canon 2(A) (2014). 
83. Id. at ch. 2, Canon 3(A)(6).  
84. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
85. Ed Whelan, Judge Calebresi’s Flagrant Ethical Violation, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 31, 
2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/374615/judge-calabresis-flagrant-ethical-
violation-ed-whelan [https://perma.cc/N6U8-QLL7]. 
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unhelpfully broad in defining limits on judicial speech. Canon 4 of the 
Code of Conduct is perhaps more helpful. It provides that: 
A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities, including law-
related pursuits . . . . However, a judge should not participate in 
extrajudicial activities that detract from the dignity of the 
judge’s office, interfere with the performance of the judge’s 
official duties, reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality, [or] 
lead to frequent disqualification . . . . 
A. Law-related Activities 
1. Speaking, Writing, and Teaching. A judge may speak, write, 
lecture, teach, and participate in other activities concerning the 
law, the legal system, and the administration of justice. 
2. Consulting. A judge may consult with or appear at a public 
hearing before an executive or legislative body or official 
(a) on matters concerning the law, the legal system, or the 
administration of justice; 
(b) to the extent that it would generally be perceived that a 
judge’s judicial experience provides special expertise in the 
area; or 
(c) when the judge is acting pro se in a matter involving the 
judge or the judge’s interest.86 
Canon 4 of the Judicial Code of Conduct clearly permits judicial 
lobbying about issues for which a “judge’s judicial experience provides 
special expertise in the area.”87 One can debate about whether Canon 4 
permits judicial lobbying in legal areas that do not directly touch on 
matters directed at the judiciary, but an amendment to the ethical rules in 
2008 (which added section 4(A)(1)) removed any doubts that may have 
existed as to the propriety of judicial lobbying. In the commentary to 
Canon 4, judges are encouraged to opine on legislation: 
As a judicial officer and a person specially learned in the law, a 
judge is in a unique position to contribute to the law, the legal 
system, and the administration of justice, including revising 
substantive and procedural law and improving criminal and 
juvenile justice. To the extent that the judge’s time permits and 
impartiality is not compromised, the judge is encouraged to do 
so, either independently or through a bar association, judicial 
conference, or other organization dedicated to the law.
88
 
                                                     
86.  Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 82, at ch. 1, Canon 4(A)(1)–(2). 
87. Id. at Canon 4(A)(2)(b). 
88. Id. at Canon 4, Commentary. 
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Thus, there appear to be few formal ethical restrictions on judicial 
lobbying activity. Of course, judges should not comment on pending 
cases under Canon 3, but they face few restrictions in commenting on 
legislation. What questions remained regarding judicial speech were 
entirely laid to rest with the adoption of Canon 4(A)(1). As long as 
judges refrain from commenting about current cases, they may lobby 
Congress. 
C. Informal Restrictions on Judicial Lobbying 
Although there appear to be few formal constitutional, statutory, or 
ethical restraints on judicial lobbying, a strong norm has developed 
which limits judicial lobbying efforts to a single subject: judicial 
reform.
89
 Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the reasons for such 
restraint in his 1993 Year-End Report for the Federal Judiciary: 
[W]hat is an appropriate sentence for a particular offense, and 
similar matters, are questions upon which a judge’s view should 
carry no more weight than the view of any other citizen. In such 
cases I do not believe that the Judicial Conference . . . should 
take an official position.
90
 
While the specifics of Justice Rehnquist’s statement have been 
questioned (some believe that sentencing is an area of “special 
expertise” for the judiciary), his broader point that individual judges 
should avoid commenting on statutes that do not concern judicial 
administration—even if not ethically or legally prohibited—is almost 
universally accepted.
91
 Chief Justice Burger noted the demarcation 
between judges advising on broad policy matters and judges advising on 
court-specific matters: 
Justices have come to realize that they should avoid advising 
Presidents and the Congress on substantive policy questions but 
on matters relating to the courts there must be joint consultation. 
                                                     
89. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 46, at 258 (“The idea of judicial lobbying is anathema to 
many. It somehow seems inappropriate for federal judges, whose adjudicative role requires 
neutrality rather than advocacy, to urge the passage or defeat of proposed legislation. In spite of its 
negative connotations, however, lobbying is nothing more than communicating information and 
considered opinion to the appropriate decisionmakers. No one has more accurate information on 
matters of judicial administration or is in a better position to comment on conditions facing the 
courts than the federal judge.”). 
90. CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST, 1994 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(Dec. 30, 1994). 
91. See Kelso, supra note 28, at 852 (stating the universal acceptance of informal restrictions on 
extrajudicial lobbying); Winkle, supra note 40, at 273 (arguing judges should provide input to 
Congress, as long as they do not “subvert” judicial ideals).  
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The separation of powers does not preclude such 
consultation . . . . To be sure, there is a great and necessary 
tradition of insulation of judges from political activities 
generally. But participation in legislative and executive 
decisions which affect the judicial system is an absolute 
obligation of judges.
92
 
This norm against pronouncements of general policy by the judiciary 
has developed in response to two primary concerns about overbroad 
judicial lobbying. First, commentators have worried that excessive 
judicial lobbying undermines the neutrality of the judicial office.
93
 If 
judges are engaged in legislative battles, how can they then coldly 
review the resulting legislation from those battles? Second, 
commentators have worried that widespread judicial lobbying would 
undermine the legitimacy of the federal judiciary.
94
 The public’s 
confidence in the judiciary and Congress’s respect for the finality of 
judicial review could both be undermined if judges are unfettered in 
their lobbying activities.
95
 
An obvious objection to judicial lobbying is the prohibition on 
judicial advisory opinions. The restriction on advisory opinions has a 
long, nearly unbroken pedigree in the United States.
96
 In 1793, then-
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson requested legal advice from the 
Supreme Court regarding certain treaty matters with France.
97
 In 
response, Chief Justice John Jay declined to advise the President.
98
 
Citing separation of powers concerns and the Court’s status as a “court 
of last resort,” he argued “against the propriety of . . . extra-judicially 
                                                     
92. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 1815–16 (quoting Warren E. Burger, Accepting the Fordham-
Stein Award (Oct. 25, 1978)). 
93. See Kelso, supra note 28, at 852 (“Many—I hope most—would agree that something is 
wrong with supreme court justices actively opposing a ballot proposition in an attempt to influence 
the vote.”). 
94. See Abner K. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to Professor Neal 
Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825, 1829 (1998) (“The closer the judicial decision-making process 
comes to the political process, the more suspect the particular decision becomes.”).  
95. Id. 
96. The one exception appears to be President Monroe’s request from the Supreme Court for an 
opinion on whether the federal government could use federal money for internal improvements. The 
Court answered in the affirmative. E. F. Albertsworth, Advisory Functions in Federal Supreme 
Court, 23 GEO. L.J. 643, 644 (1935). 
97. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (July 12, 1793), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, 744 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 
1998); see also William R. Casto, The Early Supreme Court Justices’ Most Significant Opinion, 29 
OHIO N.U.L. REV. 173, 174–85 (2002) (detailing the history of the John Jay letter). 
98. Id. 
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deciding the questions.”99 Jay’s refusal to provide an advisory opinion 
was formally acknowledged over a century later in Muskrat v. United 
States,
100
 with the Court holding that it was unable to provide “opinions 
in the nature of advice concerning legislative action.”101 
When judges engage in lobbying for particular bills, their actions may 
be seen as akin to advisory opinions. Lobbying exposes a judge’s 
opinion on the merits (or lack thereof) of legislative action before that 
action has been formally challenged in court.
102
 Opponents of such bills 
may rightly feel that a judge could not objectively evaluate the 
constitutionality of a bill for which he or she has previously voiced 
support or opposition. 
Concerns about judicial fairness are raised even when actions by a 
judge do not rise to the level of an advisory opinion. Merely voicing 
support or disfavor for a particular policy action, even if not directed at a 
specific piece of legislation, could undermine the appearance of judicial 
neutrality.
103
 For example, if a judge were to write an op-ed in favor of 
eliminating all obscenity laws, a prosecutor bringing an obscenity case 
might legitimately question that judge’s ability to even-handedly 
adjudge his or her case.
104
 
Many commentators are troubled by the erosion of public goodwill 
that might occur when judges engage in lobbying.
105
 Legislators are 
elected by the people to craft policy.
106
 They actively debate policy goals 
while running for election.
107
 After being elected, they solicit the views 
of experts, constituents, lobbyists, and other interest groups.
108
 A 
                                                     
99. Letter from John Jay to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND 
PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488–89 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1890). 
100. 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
101. Id. at 362. 
102. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 1804–05 (stating “[t]here are good reasons” to have a case or 
controversy requirement, including legislative interference). 
103. See Stephen Reinhart, Judicial Speech and the Open Judiciary, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 805, 
805 (1995) (“Concerns about fairness and the appearance of fairness far outweigh any benefits that 
might result from such speech . . . .”). 
104. Consider the case of Judge Alex Kozinski, who recused himself in an obscenity trial after 
sexually explicit material was found on his website. Scott Glover, U.S. Judge in Obscenity Trial 
Steps Down, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/14/local/me-
kozinski14 [https://perma.cc/A24N-7DDY]. 
105. See Winkle III, supra note 40, at 265 (“Lobbying . . . may impair the adjudicative function, 
jeopardize impartiality, or compromise the integrity of the court.”). 
106. See Mikva, supra note 94, at 1828–29 (comparing the legislative decision-making process to 
the judicial decision-making process). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
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deliberative process of drafting, voting, and redrafting of legislative 
provisions occurs in committee and then in the congressional 
chambers.
109
 The same process occurs in the other congressional 
chamber before a bill is sent along to the President.
110
 The deliberative, 
democratic nature of the legislative process is what legitimizes the laws 
that Congress ultimately adopts.
111
 
In contrast, the judicial decision-making process is designed to 
severely limit the types of information and viewpoints that can be 
consulted.
112
 Judges are generally precluded from relying on information 
found outside of the official record of a case.
113
 Legal decisions are not 
meant to be policy decisions.
114
 They are intended to be insulated, to 
some degree, from the influences of outside interests. To the extent that 
judges step outside of their roles as judges and enter into the legislative 
realm, they may be sacrificing the virtues that separate them from their 
legislative colleagues.
115
 
II. JUDICIAL LOBBYING 
Judges frequently promote or challenge legislative proposals—they 
lobby.
116
 Their lobbying efforts have not been limited to issues of 
judicial administration, either.
117
 As this Part will demonstrate, judges 
have been very active in lobbying on a broad range of policy matters. 
For instance, judges have played key roles in matters of court 
organization, including actively lobbying for and against splitting the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal.
118
 The Fifth Circuit was 
eventually split, largely on the basis of unanimous support from the 
circuit’s judges while the Ninth Circuit has yet to be split due to 
                                                     
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1829. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. 
115. Id. 
116. See Winkle III, supra note 40, at 264–72 (chronicling the lobbying efforts around habeas 
corpus reform). 
117. See infra section II.B. 
118. See generally BARROW & WALKER, supra note 51 (discussing, in general, the Fifth Circuit 
divide); Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries—Why the Proposal to Divide the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917 
(1990) (arguing against dividing the Ninth Circuit). 
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widespread opposition from the judges in that circuit.
119
 Judges have 
also been heavily involved in debates about sentencing reform.
120
 But 
judges have also been active on policy questions that have little to do 
with judicial efficiency or issues that involve judicial discretion, 
including patent reform, bankruptcy reform, and tax reform, among 
others.
121
 
This Part briefly describes historical judicial lobbying efforts. Then, it 
analyzes modern judicial lobbying campaigns by grouping lobbying 
efforts into three categories: Article III issues, judicial administration 
issues, and general policy issues. 
Article III issues include one of two types of legislative proposals 
based on Congress’s constitutionally-provided powers: attempts to 
establish “inferior [c]ourts” or attempts to alter the judicial branch’s 
jurisdiction over certain “cases” or “controversies.”122 For instance, 
congressional debate about splitting established federal judicial circuits 
has attracted spirited debate from judges.
123
 Similarly, congressional 
debate about the creation of new courts, such as the bankruptcy courts, 
has met fierce criticism from judicial officers.
124
 Judges have also 
attempted to restrict the types of decision-makers protected by Article 
III’s safeguards.125 Congressional attempts to limit federal court 
jurisdiction have also been subject to intense lobbying from judges.
126
 
But judicial lobbying has not been limited to constitutional questions 
or debates about the nature of judging. Much judicial lobbying effort has 
been focused on matters of judicial administration—the day to day 
management of federal cases.
127
 Federal judges have not shied away 
from opining on the need for increased administrative assistance in the 
                                                     
119. Id. 
120. See Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety 
Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389 (2008) (promoting state sentencing 
reform). 
121. See infra section II.C. 
122. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
123. See, e.g., BARROW & WALKER, supra note 51 at 153–83 (detailing the politics that 
ultimately led to the splitting of the Fifth Circuit).  
124. See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 47, 88–99 (1997) (detailing the judicial role in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). 
125. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article 
III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 995 (2000) (“As a lobbying organization, the federal judiciary has 
chosen to oppose creation of new federal rights, to support retrenchment of the roles of life-tenured 
judges, and to propose delegation of many of their tasks to other judges.”). 
126. Id. 
127. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 10, at 164–67 (describing judicial officers’ attempts to influence 
the legislative branch). 
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judicial process.
128
 They have lobbied for increased roles for magistrate 
judges, bankruptcy judges, and other non-Article III decision-makers.
129
 
Federal judges have also been involved in sustained, organized 
campaigns for increased judicial salaries.
130
 
The third category of judicial lobbying is the most intriguing, yet least 
studied. Despite the norms against judicial lobbying on policy matters, 
federal judges have repeatedly lobbied Congress on legislative matters 
with little direct impact on the judicial branch.
131
 The range of issues on 
which judges have lobbied is vast: from patent law to criminal 
sentencing, from unemployment benefits to governmental 
wiretapping.
132
 Judicial lobbying on policy matters is the most 
problematic sort of lobbying from an ethical standpoint. Although 
currently permitted by the Judicial Code of Conduct, lobbying the 
legislature outside of the formal dialogue spaces of cases and statutes 
may expose judges to accusations of bias and partisanship. By weighing 
in on controversial policies, judges sacrifice the veneer of impartiality 
that sustains confidence in the justice system.
133
 Thus, it is logical to ask 
why judicial lobbying in policy matters is so prevalent. Why would 
judges potentially undermine the legitimacy of their office by engaging 
in public lobbying efforts? After describing the history of judicial 
lobbying, this Part offers some potential answers to that question. 
A. Judicial Lobbying, Historically 
There is a long history of judges engaging with legislators.
134
 Since 
the United States was founded, judges, particularly Supreme Court 
Justices, have played an active role in crafting and advising on 
legislation that directly impacts the judicial branch.
135
 Over the first 
                                                     
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 42, at 62–64 (summarizing the history of judicial lobbying 
about judicial salaries). 
131. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 1069–76 (detailing judicial lobbying efforts in the 
patent field).  
132. Id. 
133. See, e.g., Kevin D. Swan, Comment, Protecting the Appearance of Judicial Impartiality in 
the Face of Law Clerk Employment Negotiations, 62 WASH. L. REV. 813, 814–15 (1987) (stating 
that public support of judicial decisions requires the appearance of impartiality).   
134. Early Supreme Court Justices traveled widely and interacted with state legislatures thru the 
grand jury process. For more on the early process of grand jury instructions, see Helene E. 
Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 701, 750–55 
(1972). 
135. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 1741–53 (discussing the role of early Supreme Court Justices 
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century of this nation’s history, the judiciary’s interactions with statutory 
reform were largely ad hoc, however. Neal Katyal, a scholar of the early 
American experience with judicial speech, finds that “[t]hroughout the 
first decades of the Republic, judges, acting in their individual 
capacities, provided Congress with advice about legislative matters.”136 
Katyal notes that courts have advised legislators by “private letter” and 
“back-room discussion,” among other methods.137 Charles Geyh has 
described the period from 1789–1922 as one of “unstructured 
interaction” between Congress and the courts.138 Peter Fish has 
chronicled numerous examples of judges engaged in the legislative work 
of testifying about, drafting, and publically supporting court-related 
legislation in the nineteenth century.
139
 Indeed, while Congress was 
debating amendments to the 1789 Judiciary Act, two United States 
Supreme Court Justices authored an alternative bill for Congress’s 
consideration.
140
 
The historical record of judges attempting to influence congressional 
decisions is not limited to the early days of the Republic. Chief Justice 
Taft successfully fought against the Caraway Bill which would have 
prevented federal judges from commenting to jurors about a witness’ 
credibility.
141
 Similarly, Chief Justice Hughes sent a letter to a prominent 
senator opposing, and ultimately helping to defeat, President Roosevelt’s 
court-packing plan.
142
 In short, despite the generally-accepted norms 
against extra-judicial advice-giving, judges have, periodically, openly 
lobbied Congress. 
One of the greatest Supreme Court lobbyists, Chief Justice William 
Howard Taft, successfully lobbied Congress to create what would 
become the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1922.
143
 This 
effort would move judicial lobbying out of the era of backroom 
                                                     
in advising the president and Congress). 
136. Id. at 1741. 
137. Id. at 1742–43. 
138. Geyh, supra note 10, at 1171–72. 
139. PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 11, 14–17 (1973) 
(describing judicial lobbying efforts on judicial-reform legislation). 
140. Katyal, supra note 10, at 1741. 
141. MURPHY, supra note 10. 
142. Katyal, supra note 10, at 1751–52. 
143. See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 331 (1994)); see FISH, supra note 139, at 30–32 (describing Chief Justice Taft’s role in the 
legislative effort); Geyh, supra note 10, at 1172 (same). The Judicial Conference was originally 
named the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges. Its name was changed in 1948. See Act of June 25, 
1948, ch. 636, § 331, 62 Stat. 869, 902 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994)). 
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individual conversations and into a more open era. The Judicial 
Conference serves as the governing body of the federal judiciary and is 
headed by the Chief Justice. Since 1939, the Judicial Conference has 
been supported by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
(“AO”).144 The AO assists the Judicial Conference in drafting 
legislation. The AO staff also monitors judicially-focused legislative 
activity on Capitol Hill and frequently testifies before congressional 
committees.
145
 In 1967, in response to a suggestion from the Judicial 
Conference, Congress created the Federal Judicial Center to provide 
judicial education and to improve the judiciary’s research capabilities.146 
All of these newly-formed organizations created a formalized 
structure for direct judicial lobbying of Congress. The Judicial 
Conference sends annual reports to Congress.
147
 Those reports have, 
since the inception of the Judicial Conference, included 
recommendations for legislation.
148
 In addition, the AO submits annual 
reports to Congress concerning the workload of the courts.
149
 But the 
AO and the Judicial Conference also serve as conduits for interbranch 
communications between Congress and the courts. Congress regularly 
asks the director of the AO to testify concerning legislative proposals 
and the impact those proposals might have on judicial case 
management.
150
 Furthermore, Congress often asks for specific input on 
legislation from the Judicial Center.
151
 
                                                     
144. Geyh, supra note 10, at 1175. 
145. Id. In 1991, the Judicial Conference created the Office of Judicial Impact Assessment 
(OJIA) within the AO to evaluate the potential impact on the judiciary of proposed legislation.  
146. See Russell Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial Administration: 
Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 31 (1988) (describing the 
creation of the FJC). 
147. See Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, the 
Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 42–45 (1985) 
(questioning the role played by the Chief Justice and the Judicial Conference in the bankruptcy 
amendments of 1984). 
148. Geyh, supra note 10, at 1173 & n.27 (noting policy recommendations of the Judicial 
Conference); see also REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/reports-proceedings-
judicial-conference-us [https://perma.cc/3TPW-TW74] [hereinafter 2015 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
REPORT].  
149. Administrative Office Act of 1939, § 305, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 332 (1994)). 
150. See, e.g., MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL: INTERACTIONS 
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 25 (2009) (“[J]udges often allow the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts . . . to speak for them on legislative matters.”). 
151. Id. (“[T]he Judicial Conference will sometimes seek invitations to comment on legislative 
proposals.”). 
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But the creation of more formalized judicial lobbying organizations 
has left some dissatisfied. Scholars have disputed whether the courts 
should engage as thoroughly with Congress as they have in the past.
152
 
Despite the historical precedent for judicial involvement with legislation, 
Katyal is not persuaded that history is the best normative guide.
153
 For 
him, “[e]xtrajudicial advice raises troublesome issues about judicial 
propriety and smoky, back-room deals.”154 But Katyal argues that judges 
do have a role to play as “advicegivers” in the legislative process.155 He 
advocates for “advicegiving via written opinions in cases and 
controversies,” not in extra-judicial forums.156 Thus, he is not arguing in 
favor of judicial lobbying as defined in this Article. 
B. Modern Judicial Lobbying 
Despite the presence of an organized administrative complex for 
judicial lobbying centered at the Judicial Center, ad hoc judicial 
lobbying continues to this day. Yet some common concerns about 
judicial lobbying should be noted. First, widespread judicial lobbying 
threatens the legitimacy of the judiciary. If judges are perceived as 
biased decision-makers, the judiciary sits on precarious ground with both 
the public and the other branches of government.
157
 No other branch 
depends so heavily on the perception of impartiality in its actions.
158
 
Second, judges are discouraged from lobbying on general legal 
matters because such lobbying might be seen as unfair to litigants.
159
 If a 
judge is asked to review the legality of a statute for which the judge has 
previously lobbied, it is reasonable to think that such action might 
influence a future decision. Litigants would likely feel that such a judge 
would not be able to give a fair decision about the statute’s validity. 
                                                     
152. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 1752 (claiming that past judicial precedent does not provide 
cover for judicial advicegiving). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. See, e.g., James M. Scheppele, Are We Turning Judges Into Politicians?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1517, 1521 (2005) (“As both a coequal branch of government and an impartial arbiter of 
disputes, it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to solicit money.”). 
158. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 315, 315 (1999) (“Concern about judicial independence has been a recurrent feature of 
American history . . . .”). 
159. See Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in Court 
Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 373–79 (2009) (describing the right to an “unbiased judiciary”). 
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Consider the case of Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,
160
 which dealt with 
whether judges could solicit money for their election.
161
 In finding that 
such solicitation was forbidden, the Supreme Court recognized “a 
compelling interest in preserving public confidence in their 
judiciaries.”162 Judicial lobbying makes judges look more like politicians 
and less like neutral arbiters. 
A third concern about judicial lobbying involves the value of such 
lobbying. While federal judges are well-educated and qualified 
individuals, there is little reason to think that judges are experts on most 
policy questions.
163
 Thus, we may not want judges lobbying because 
they are not very good at selecting a policy position that benefits the 
public. The value of judicial input in the legislative process is likely to 
be outweighed by the potential downsides of judicial lobbying. 
Lastly, judicial lobbying risks alienating congressmen who may, 
rightly or wrongly, view such actions as a breach of the separation of 
powers.
164
 There is always some risk that any judicial action will anger 
some faction of Congress, but judicial lobbying efforts seem to be 
extremely troubling to various congressmen.
165
 Each branch of 
government desires to maintain its particular sphere of influence and 
judicial lobbying may be threatening to the legislative branch. 
This section attempts to make sense of those continued efforts by 
examining the circumstances in which they occur. It focuses on three 
types of lobbying efforts: Article III issues (creation of new courts and 
judges, for example); judicial administration issues (issues that directly 
impact the judiciary, but which do not implicate constitutional 
concerns); and policy issues (issues that have little or no connection to 
the functioning of the court). 
                                                     
160. __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
161. See id. Williams-Yulee dealt with campaign contributions for elected state officials, but the 
issue of judicial integrity applies with equal force to federal judges. 
162. Id. at 1673. 
163. See Barbara A. Spellman, On the Supposed Expertise of Judges in Evaluating Evidence, 156 
U. PENN. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 1, 6–7 (2007) (“There is no good reason to conclude that, by virtue 
of qualities, training, or experience, trial judges should be considered experts at weighting evidence 
or at fact-finding”); but see Robin Jacob, Knowledge of the World and the Act of Judging, 2 
OSGOODE HALL REV. L. & POL’Y 22, 22–28 (2014) (arguing that knowledge of general matters is 
essential to good judging, or at least the perception of good judging).  
164. See John Conyers, Conyers: Patent System Needs Updating, ROLL CALL (June 8, 2010), 
http://www.rollcall.com/features/Technology_Telecommunications/tandt/-48169-1.html 
[https://perma.cc/T3QW-HM57] (“Congress, not the courts, must clarify and update patent law.”). 
165. See id.; Winkle III, supra note 40, at 265 (“Lobbying . . . may . . . compromise the integrity 
of the court.”). 
04 - Anderson.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016  3:50 PM 
426 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:401 
 
1. Article III Issues 
a. The Creation of New Federal Circuit Courts 
The Constitution vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court and 
“such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”166 Judges have been very active in lobbying for and against 
Congress’s creation of such courts. From an informational perspective, it 
makes sense that the legislative process required to create new courts 
would include judicial involvement: judges are experts at judging, and 
can inform lawmakers about optimal arrangements of judges. 
Within the past forty years, Congress has seriously considered 
splitting two federal judicial circuits: the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits. In 
the 1960s, the increasing number of civil rights cases being filed in the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—which covered the states of Texas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Georgia—threatened to 
overwhelm the circuit’s judges.167 In response, Chief Justice Warren 
authorized a special committee to make recommendations about the 
workload of the Fifth Circuit.
168
 The resulting Biggs committee advised 
that the Fifth Circuit needed fifteen judges to efficiently handle its 
caseload: six more than were currently on the court.
169
 Thus, the 
committee recommended splitting the circuit into two, dividing the 
circuit along the Mississippi River.
170
 Such a division entailed serious 
political consequences, however. Separating the judges based in Texas 
and Louisiana from the rest of the circuit would effectively dilute the 
influence of the four liberal judges on the court.
171
 Some of those liberal 
judges campaigned publicly against the division, arguing that it would 
undermine civil rights gains in the South.
172
 Despite the warnings of the 
Biggs committee, political opposition to any circuit division had 
effectively killed all proposals by 1964.
173
 
Instead of splitting the circuit, Congress authorized new judgeships 
for the Fifth Circuit. By 1978, the court had swelled to twenty-six 
                                                     
166. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
167. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 51, at 64. 
168. Id. at 8. 
169. Id. at 64. 
170. Id. at 65. 
171. Each newly created circuit would have contained only two liberal judges. Id. 
172. Id. at 65, 88. 
173. Id. at 63–68, 121. 
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judges.
174
 In response, all of the judges on the circuit wrote a letter to 
Congress urging division.
175
 Political concerns remained, however, and 
the judges were forced to take on even more active roles in the 
legislative process. Thus, they encouraged civil rights activists to join 
their lobbying efforts.
176
 They also encouraged judges who were racial 
minorities to voice their approval to members of Congress.
177
 
Furthermore, they alleviated political concerns by proposing to include 
Mississippi in the reformed Fifth Circuit.
178
 Finally, in October 1980 the 
judges’ efforts proved successful when Congress divided the circuit and 
created the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
179
 
Similar proposals to split the Ninth Circuit have encountered 
resistance from that circuit’s judges. The Ninth Circuit is the largest, 
most congested circuit court in the country, covering the states of 
California, Hawaii, Alaska, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, Idaho, 
Montana, and Nevada as well as the territories of Guam and the 
Northern Mariana Islands. Its twenty-eight active judges dwarf all other 
circuit courts, the second largest of which has seventeen judgeships.
180
 
The court’s size and massive caseload has led to delays in 
adjudication,
181
 the abandonment of en banc review in favor of the 
problematic “limited en banc” review,182 and a notoriously high reversal 
rate at the Supreme Court.
183
 Various legislative proposals have been put 
                                                     
174. Id. at 1, 64. 
175. Id. at 236. 
176. Id. at 237–38. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 
1994 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2012)). 
180. Legislative Proposals to Split the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: 
Hearing on S. 1845 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of 
Rachel L. Brand, Assistant Att’y Gen. for Legal Policy). 
181. Examining the Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit: Hearing on S. 1845 Before the S. 
Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Diarmuid O’Scannlain, Circuit Judge, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) (“The Ninth Circuit’s enormous size . . . creates 
problems for our litigants. In my court, the median time from when a party activates an appeal to 
when it receives resolution is over 15 months—four months longer than the average for the rest of 
the Courts of Appeals.”). 
182. 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (“[A limited en banc hearing] shall consist of the Chief Judge of this circuit 
and 10 additional judges to be drawn by lot from the active judges of the Court. In the absence of 
the Chief Judge, an 11th active judge shall be drawn by lot, and the most senior active judge on the 
panel shall preside.”). Such limited en banc review has been criticized. See Peter S. Menell & Ryan 
Vacca, Reconsidering En Banc Review: A Circuit Stewardship Theory (work in progress) (on file 
with author). 
183. Kevin M. Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 341, 345 
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forward that would split the circuit into two (or in one case, three) 
circuits.
184
 
Despite the size of the circuit, as of 2005 only three judges on the 
circuit favored any of the various legislative proposals designed to split 
the court.
185
 In fact, many of the judges on the circuit have publicly 
lobbied for the Ninth Circuit to remain in its present state. As was the 
case in the debate surrounding proposals to split the Fifth Circuit, much 
of the debate about how to divide the Ninth Circuit has centered on 
politics. The Ninth Circuit is one of the most reliably liberal circuits in 
the country, despite presiding over some of the most conservative-
leaning states in the union (e.g., Arizona, Idaho, Montana).
186
 Ninth 
Circuit judges have nearly unanimously lobbied against splitting their 
circuit.
187
 In part due to deference to those judges’ views, Congress has 
yet to act and legislation splitting the Ninth Circuit appears unlikely to 
pass in the near term.
188
 
                                                     
(2006) (“[O]ver the past twenty-one Supreme Court terms (since the Fifth Circuit was split), the 
Ninth Circuit has been reversed an average of 14.48 times, with the next closest circuit (the ‘new’ 
Fifth) reversed 5.14 times per term over the same time period.”). 
184. See Circuit Court of Appeals Restructuring and Modernization Act of 2007, S. 525, 110th 
Cong. (proposing splitting the Ninth Circuit into two with California, Guam, Hawaii, and the 
Northern Mariana Islands remaining in the Ninth); Circuit Court of Appeals Restructuring and 
Modernization Act of 2005, S. 1845, 109th Cong. (proposing splitting the Ninth Circuit into two, 
with California, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands remaining in the Ninth Circuit); 
Ninth Circuit Judgeship and Reorganization Act of 2005, H.R. 211, 109th Cong. (proposing 
splitting the Ninth Circuit in three, with California, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana 
Islands in the Ninth, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana in the Twelfth, and Alaska, Oregon, and 
Washington in the Thirteenth); Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judgeship and Reorganization Act of 
2003, H.R. 2723, 108th Cong. (proposing splitting the Ninth Circuit into two, with Arizona, 
California and Nevada remaining in the Ninth Circuit); Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Reorganization Act of 2003, S. 562, 108th Cong. (proposing splitting the Ninth Circuit into two, 
with California and Nevada remaining in the Ninth Circuit and all other jurisdictions being assigned 
to a new Twelfth Circuit). 
185. Revisiting Proposals to Split the Ninth Circuit: An Inevitable Solution to a Growing 
Problem: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit) [hereinafter Kozinski]. 
186. Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and 
the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 408 (1998) (“One reads about a court that is ‘big, feisty and 
liberal,’ a ‘renegade court’ that includes ‘one of the last unabashed liberals,’ and many ‘colorful’ 
judges . . . .”); see also Matt Ford, Arizona v. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 
4, 2016) (highlighting proposals from Arizona politicians to split the Ninth Circuit).  
187. See Kozinski, supra note 185. 
188. See Diarmuid O’Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split Is Inevitable, but Not Imminent, 56 OHIO 
ST. L. REV. 947, 950 (1995) (urging Congress to take it slow in dividing the Ninth Circuit). 
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b. Defining Article III “Judge” 
Another area of proposed legislation that has attracted the attention of 
the judiciary involves bills that would increase the number of Article III 
judges. For instance, in 1973 after several years of study, the 
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States proposed 
legislation to Congress that would have created fifteen-year terms for 
bankruptcy judges.
189
 Unhappy with the proposal, the National 
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges drafted a separate bill that would have 
conferred Article III status on bankruptcy judges.
190
 Elevating 
bankruptcy judges to Article III judges would have granted those judges 
life tenure, among the other benefits that accompany Article III status. 
Prior to the National Conference’s proposal, the Judicial Conference 
of the United States had largely been silent on bankruptcy reform.
191
 
However, once the House produced a legislative proposal that would 
have conferred life tenure on bankruptcy judges, the Judicial Conference 
undertook lobbying efforts to keep bankruptcy judges as Article I 
judges.
192
 Chief Justice Burger was heavily involved in the lobbying 
efforts coordinated by the Judicial Conference. He made numerous 
phone calls to key senators and congressmen as well as Attorney 
General Griffin Bell in an effort to limit the bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction and tenure.
193
 Those lobbying efforts ultimately proved 
successful as Congress passed bankruptcy reform bills that established 
bankruptcy courts in every jurisdiction, but designated bankruptcy 
judges as Article I judges who serve fourteen-year terms.
194
 
Judith Resnik has summarized the organized lobbying by the Judicial 
Conference as “a lobby against federal jurisdiction.”195 To her, the 
lobbying efforts of the Judicial Conference have coalesced around 
keeping cases out of federal court, keeping Article III judges separate 
from non-tenured “federal” judges, and reducing litigants’ rights.196 This 
less-than-flattering take on judicial lobbying deftly explains the efforts 
of the judicial conference during the period of bankruptcy reform. 
                                                     
189. Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 Part Three: On the Hill, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 341 (2007). 
190. Id. at 341–42. 
191. Id. at 342. 
192. Id. at 365–70.  
193. Id. 
194. Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-361, 106 Stat. 965 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 152 (2012)). 
195. Resnik, supra note 125, at 930. 
196. See id. at 929–30. 
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2. Judicial Administration 
Federal judges have also actively lobbied for statutory improvements 
related to the administrative aspects of judging. While the Constitution 
guarantees judicial salaries will not be reduced, it provides no guidance 
on what salaries are appropriate and when they should be raised: “The 
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts . . . shall, at stated 
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance in Office.”197 Thus, during various 
periods of U.S. history, judges have lobbied Congress to increase 
judicial salaries.
198
 
At times, this lobbying for increased salaries has occurred through the 
official channels of the Judicial Conference.
199
 At other times, however, 
it has taken a more ad hoc approach. For instance, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist conducted a press conference and called judicial salaries the 
most pressing issue facing the legal system.
200
 His successor, Chief 
Justice Roberts, characterized the judicial pay issue as a “constitutional 
crisis” in his 2006 annual report to Congress.201 Ultimately, the issue 
was decided by the courts, not the legislature. In 2012, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided Beer v. United States,
202
 in 
which six federal judges challenged the constitutionality of Congress’s 
repeated decisions to deny promised cost-of-living to federal judges over 
a fifteen-year period.
203
 The court held that Congress had impermissibly 
withheld judicial pay.
204
 
When it comes to judicial salaries, judges have also looked to 
organizations beyond the Judicial Conference for lobbying assistance. In 
1981, a group of several hundred federal judges formed the Federal 
                                                     
197. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
198. See 2015 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 148, at 16–17 (“The Judicial 
Conference adopted a number of legislative positions over the last two decades to address a crisis in 
judicial compensation resulting from the denial to federal judges of many annual pay adjustments 
under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.”). 
199. See SMITH, supra note 27, at 45–46 (“Chief Justice Rehnquist’s public lobbying for salary 
increases [for judges] was unanimously supported by the Judicial Conference of the United 
States . . . ”). 
200. See Smith, supra note 10, at 45 (recalling Rehnquist’s news conference). 
201. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1–8 
(Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year-endreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RP3L-NUSM]. 
202. 696 F.3d 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
203. See id. 
204. Id. 
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Judges Association (FJA).
205
 The FJA is a private organization dedicated 
to lobbying Congress on behalf of judicial compensation issues—such as 
salary and benefits—as well as on judicial administration issues.206 The 
creation of the FJA unnerved many congresspersons, who asked the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine the propriety of 
private judicial lobbying.
207
 The GAO found, among other things, that, 
as “a private, voluntary membership organization with no official 
connection to the federal government,” anti-lobbying restrictions would 
not apply to activities of the FJA.
208
 
More recently, the chief judges from eighty-seven of the ninety-four 
federal district courts signed a letter to Congress detailing the impact 
that sequestration of funds was having on the judiciary.
209
 The letter 
expressed concern about the ability of courts to continue to dispense 
timely justice, to continue funding public defenders, and to maintain 
safety and security in federal courthouses.
210
 While the letter appeared to 
be an ad hoc movement by the district courts, it may have been 
coordinated with the Judicial Center, which followed up with a similar 
request shortly thereafter.
211
 
3. Policy Issues 
The most common (not to mention intriguing) area of judicial 
lobbying efforts concerns matters of general policy. Justice, it is thought, 
is best served by having judicial officers avoid extrajudicial speech 
concerning matters of general policy and statutory reform.
212
 Despite 
                                                     
205. See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 
160–61 (1988) (describing the creation of the Federal Judges Association). 
206. Id. 
207. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-129874, REQUEST FOR GAO 
DETERMINATION CONCERNING JUDICIARY’S USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS TO LOBBY CONGRESS (1984). 
208. Id. 
209. Letter from Loretta A. Preska, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to 
Joseph R. Biden, President, U.S. Senate (Aug. 13, 2013), http://news.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/Chief-Judges-Letter-to-Joseph-Biden.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KA7-ZD4Q]. 
210. Id. 
211. Letter from John D. Bates, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Barack Obama, 
President, United States (Sept. 10, 2013), http://news.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Letter-
President-FY14-Funding_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDT2-7S9G]; see also CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN 
ROBERTS, 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Dec. 31, 2010), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2010year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/56EM-
KDFH] (calling “budgetary constraints” one of two obstacles that impedes the courts from 
achieving their goals). 
212. See Winkle III, supra note 40, at 265 (stating that lobbying is contrary to the public image of 
a judge). 
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this concern, judges have, from time to time, been active lobbyists on 
general policy. This section will detail some recent instances of such 
lobbying in the areas of patent law, surveillance law, bankruptcy law, 
and military law. 
a. Patent Law 
Patent law has experienced extensive judicial lobbying, mostly from 
judges on the specialized appellate court that handles patent appeals.
213
 
In the late-1970s, Congress began considering the creation of specialized 
courts to handle patent cases.
214
 As a result, Congress created the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982.
215
 Since its creation, 
the judges of the Federal Circuit have been active in legislative affairs.
216
 
During the four-year debate about patent reform between 2004 and 2008 
(culminating in the passage of the America Invents Act
217
), the court 
made numerous attempts to influence the shape of the ultimate 
legislation. 
On May 3, 2007, while the Patent Reform Acts of 2007
218
 were 
                                                     
213. For more on the appeal of lobbying in the patent space, see Robert P. Merges, The Trouble 
with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1607–14 
(proposing a greater delineation of “patent trolls” by both the courts and Congress). 
214. A number of existing, specialized courts were combined to create the Federal Circuit. U.S. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S., UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982–1990, at 1 (1991). 
215. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (referring to creation of the Federal Circuit as “a sustained experiment 
in specialization”); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference 
for the PTO, 54 WILL. & MARY L. REV 1959, 2001–05 (2013) (rejecting two arguments for denying 
the PTO Chevron deference based on the Federal Circuit’s creation). 
216. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the last three Chief Judges of the court have extensive legislative 
experience. Chief Judge Michel was chief counsel for Senator Arlen Specter. See Kristina Peterson, 
Retiring Chief Federal Patent Judge May Start Think Tank, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2009), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125934593867466659 [http://perma.cc/8U2C-3JRB]. Chief Judge 
Rader served as legislative director of the House Ways and Means Committee before serving as 
counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1980–1988. He has also served as counsel for the 
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights. See Tony Dutra, Judge Randall Rader Will 
Step Down as Federal Circuit Chief Effective May 30, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 29, 2014), 
http://www.bna.com/judge-randall-rader-n17179890796/ [https://perma.cc/PN6Y-JW3W]. Judge 
Prost served as Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee immediately before her elevation 
to the bench, and prior to that served as the Chief Counsel for the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources. Ryan Davis, New Federal Circuit Chief Has Deep Patent Background, LAW360 
(May 28, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/542118/new-fed-circ-chief-has-deep-patent-
background [https://perma.cc/5ZDE-CT66]. 
217. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(o), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2012)). 
218. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. 
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pending before House and Senate committees, the Federal Circuit’s 
Chief Judge Michel sent a letter to Senators Leahy and Hatch.
219
 In that 
letter, Chief Judge Michel expressed his opposition towards two aspects 
of the proposed legislation.
220
 Specifically, Chief Judge Michel argued 
that the provisions on damage apportionment and claim construction 
interlocutory appeals were unnecessary and incapable of being 
implemented by the courts.
221
 As for damages, he argued that judges 
were not economic experts and would have difficulty making fine 
economic decisions.
222
 Making such damage determinations, he claimed, 
would inundate courts with extra work and invite battles between 
competing experts.
223
 
Regarding claim construction, Chief Judge Michel argued that many 
claim construction decisions quickly led to summary judgment and 
therefore were not in need of interlocutory review.
224
 Requiring 
interlocutory review, he argued, would simply prolong patent 
disputes.
225
 “[T]he courts as presently constituted,” Chief Judge Michel 
wrote, “simply cannot implement the provisions in a careful and timely 
manner.”226 
Just one month later, Chief Judge Michel sent another letter to Shanna 
Winters, Chief Counsel to the House Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property.
227
 In this letter, Chief Judge Michel 
argued that damages law was “highly stable and well understood by 
litigators as well as judges.”228 He suggested that Congress should “do 
nothing” concerning damages.229 
                                                     
219. See Letter from Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, to 
Patrick Leahy & Orrin G. Hatch, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (May 3, 2007), 
http://www.fr.com/files/uploads/attachments/patentdamages/05-03-07Michelletter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G6VL-UJ5X] (questioning whether these provisions, “if enacted, . . . could be 
effectively and efficiently administered by the courts, particularly the Federal Circuit”). 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 2. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 1. 
225. See id. at 1–2 (indicating that “[t]he new provision could double” already long delays in 
patent cases). 
226. Id. at 2. 
227. Letter from Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, to 
Shanna A. Winters, Chief Counsel, House Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual 
Property (June 7, 2007), http://www.intellectualpropertylawblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/98 
/2007/06/Michel-letter-to-Winters.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVH7-GQBH]. 
228. Id. at 1. 
229. Id. 
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Chief Judge Michel’s lobbying effort against patent reform was not 
limited to a senatorial letter-writing campaign. Chief Judge Michel also 
gave speeches to practicing attorneys in which he suggested that the 
proposed changes to damages and claim construction would adversely 
impact the work of the courts.
230
 Chief Judge Michel repeatedly urged IP 
litigators and patent holders to lobby Congress to remove the damages 
and claim construction portions of the bill.
231
 Further, he wrote various 
op-eds suggesting that Congress need not interfere in patent litigation 
reform.
232
 
Chief Judge Michel’s lobbying efforts urging legislative inaction on 
damages and claim construction received mixed results. His suggestion 
to do nothing on damage reform was initially ignored by Congress, as 
Congress made changes to the damage portions of the bills despite Chief 
Judge Michel’s criticisms.233 Ultimately, however, both claim 
construction and damages reform were dropped from the final bill.
234
 
Chief Judge Michel’s predecessor, Chief Judge Rader, has also been 
eager to express his views on patent reform. He has written op-eds 
expressing the lack of need for congressional action in the area of fee 
shifting, a subject that Congress continues to debate.
235
 Chief Judge 
Rader, even more so than Chief Judge Michel, has been quite vocal 
about the role that Congress and even the Supreme Court should play in 
setting patent policy, urging both institutions to let his court take the lead 
in patent reform. 
It is not surprising that the Federal Circuit is interested in patent 
reform legislation. While the court hears other types of cases, it is best 
                                                     
230. Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Address Before the 
Association of Corporate Patent Counsel (Jan. 28, 2008), 
http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2008/02/transcript_michel.pdf [https://perma.cc/FML7-UU6E]. 
231. See id. at 13 (urging attendees “to assure that whatever the Congress [does] . . . reflects the 
best input . . . from all of the best minds” after repeatedly critiquing the damages and interlocutory 
review provisions of draft legislation and suggesting that Congress is overburdened with other 
issues). 
232. See, e.g., Kristina Peterson, Q&A: Judge Michel on Patent Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 
2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/11/27/qa-judge-michel-on-patent-law/ [https://perma.cc/ 
P8Q8-7VFQ] (arguing that “the management of ongoing litigation [including damages is] inherently 
judicial” in nature). 
233. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007) (demonstrating modifications to damages in both House 
and Senate versions of reform despite Chief Judge Michel’s warning). 
234. See Sean B. Seymore, Foresight Bias in Patent Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1105, 1105–
06 (2015) (stating that much “attention in the patent reform debate has focused on the substantive 
standards for patentability,” which do not include claim construction or damages). 
235. Randall R. Rader et al., Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2013, at A25 
(arguing that congressional proposals on fee shifting in patent cases are unnecessary because judges 
“already have the authority to curtail” trolls by making them “pay for abusive litigation”). 
04 - Anderson.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016  3:50 PM 
2016] JUDICIAL LOBBYING 435 
 
known for and spends most of its time deciding patent appeals.
236
 
Substantial changes to the patent act—like those of the America Invents 
Act—have the potential to substantially change the day-to-day workings 
of the court. What is perhaps surprising is the way in which the Federal 
Circuit has approached legislative reform of the patent statute. Instead of 
passively waiting for the results of the legislative process, the court 
(through the chief judge) has actively lobbied Congress, usually urging 
Congress to do nothing and to leave the messy job of legal reform to the 
court. 
b. Surveillance Law 
On January 10, 2014, Judge Bates, Chief Judge of the FISA Court, 
sent the first of a series of letters to members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee expressing his views on the merits of proposed reforms of 
the U.S. surveillance program.
237
 Judge Bates viewed the Senate’s 
proposed USA Freedom Act as unduly burdensome for his court to 
implement. He suggested that the proposed inclusion of a special 
advocate in FISA Court proceedings was “potentially inconsistent with 
the requirements of Article III.”238 In his last letter, Judge Bates 
proposed specific changes to the bill. He suggested that the court should 
have discretion in appointing privacy advocates, because the court often 
hears simple cases in which an advocate would be unnecessary.
239
 He 
also suggested that publically releasing FISA Court opinions would be 
unhelpful.
240
 
In the first of his letters, Judge Bates indicated that his opposition to 
the USA Freedom Act represented that of the “Judiciary.”241 This claim 
is likely to have carried weight with Congress because at the time of his 
                                                     
236. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, YEAR-TO-DATE ACTIVITY, AS OF 
FEBRUARY 28, 2015 (2015), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-
court/statistics/ytd_activity_february_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB2R-EXTK] (tallying year-to-
date caseloads). 
237. JOHN D. BATES, COMMENTS OF THE JUDICIARY ON PROPOSALS REGARDING THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (2014), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/1-10-2014-Enclosure-re-FISA.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4T4-8DW5]; Letter 
from John D. Bates, Director, Admin. Offices of the U.S. Courts, to Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, 
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/1-13-2014-Ltr-to-DFeinstein-re-FISA.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R5Y-
RMVG]; USA FREEDOM ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 113-452, pt. 2 (2014). 
238. Letter from John D. Bates to Patrick J. Leahy, supra note 3, at 6. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. Letter from John D. Bates to Dianne Feinstein, supra note 237, at 1. 
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letters, Judge Bates also served as the Director of the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts.
242
 Judge Bates’s subsequent letters 
explained that the Judicial Conference was not consulted on his 
stance.
243
 He continued, however, to refer to his views as those of the 
Judiciary.
244
 
Judge Bates’s actions have come under criticism from legal 
scholars
245
 and legal reporters.
246
 They have also been questioned by 
other judges. In an August 2014 letter, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex 
Kozinski stated that the Judicial Conference had not considered the 
matters addressed by Judge Bates and therefore did not endorse his 
comments.
247
 
But Judge Bates is not the only judge to have publically taken a 
position on government surveillance. Indeed, two other judges on his 
court, Judges Carr and Robertson, have opined on their views of the 
proper role of surveillance by the government. Both judges have taken 
positions contrary to those of Judge Bates. After stepping down from the 
court, Judge Robertson (who remained a district court judge in the 
district of the District of Columbia) called for greater transparency in the 
court’s proceedings and an advocate to argue against the government, 
much like that found in the proposed USA FREEDOM Act.
248
 Judge 
Carr went even further, outlining in an op-ed in the New York Times a 
proposal to have court-appointed lawyers assist the court with novel 
legal questions.
249
 
The lobbying efforts of the judges on the FISA Court provide an 
interesting insight into the motives behind judicial lobbying efforts. All 
of the judges on the FISA Court are federal judges, usually (but not 
always) generalist judges from geographic district courts before their 
                                                     
242. See Michael Lipkin, Former FISA Court Judge Cautions Against Some Reforms, LAW360 
(Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/501238/former-fisa-court-judge-cautions-against-
some-reforms [https://perma.cc/RT68-XMAP]. 
243. Letter from John D. Bates to Patrick J. Leahy, supra note 3, at 6. 
244. Id. 
245. Vladeck, supra note 7. 
246. Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Judge Blasts Bill to Revamp Surveillance, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/usjudgeblastsbilltorevampsurveillance1407367365 
[https://perma.cc/A6LW-Z6NQ]. 
247. Letter from Alex Kozinski to Patrick J. Leahy, supra note 6.  
248. Pema Levy, Former FISA Court Judge: Secret Court Needs Reform, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 
9, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/former-fisa-court-judge-secret-court-needs-reform-1338671 
[https://perma.cc/TMC8-5RUN]. 
249. James G. Carr, Opinion, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2013, at A21. 
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temporary appointment to FISA Court.
250
 Such generalist district court 
judges rarely lobby Congress; in fact, as far as I can tell, Judges Bates, 
Robinson, and Carr have not publically advocated for policy positions 
when serving as district court judges. But once on the FISA Court, all 
three judges have felt compelled to interact with Congress on pending 
legislation. 
c. Bankruptcy Law 
When the House was considering the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2003,
251
 Fifth Circuit Judge Edith 
Jones, who was a former member of the National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission, wrote a letter to the chairman of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary.
252
 In the letter, she explained that she supported the bill, 
but wanted Congress to get rid of Section 414, which would have altered 
the “disinterested person” standard for bankruptcy professionals.253 In 
Judge Jones’ view, the disinterested person standard protected the 
integrity of the bankruptcy process and avoided conflicting loyalties 
between bankruptcy professionals, debtors, and creditors.
254
 Jones’ letter 
was cited by both Congressman Bachus and Congressman Nadler during 
floor debates on January 28, 2004.
255
 The letter was again cited in 2005 
in the Senate by Senator Leahy and Senator Sarbanes.
256
 
Jones has also advocated for bankruptcy reform via legal publications. 
In 1999 she published a law review article urging Congress to adopt 
means testing as a gatekeeping rule before consumers could file for 
bankruptcy.
257
 At the time of the article, means testing was a hotly 
contested congressional issue.
258
 It ultimately became part of the law in 
                                                     
250. See Current Membership – Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, UNITED STATES 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT, http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/current-membership 
[https://perma.cc/HK3H-V6QL]. 
251. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, 150 CONG. REC. 148, 
150 (2004). 
252. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron and the New Disinterestedness—The Foxes are Guarding the 
Henhouse, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 521, 525–26 (2005) (quoting from Judge Jones’ letter). 
253. Id. 
254. See id. 
255. See 150 CONG. REC. H150–51 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Bachus); id. at 
H219 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2004) (statement of Rep. Nadler). 
256. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 151 CONG. REC. 2306 
(2005). 
257. Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 
179–81 (1999). 
258. Id. at 178 (“The most contentious reform that has been suggested . . . has been the 
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2005. 
Bankruptcy cases are heard before specialized federal bankruptcy 
judges.
259
 Bankruptcy judges have also frequently engaged with 
Congress on bankruptcy reform, but usually only upon the request of 
Congress to do so.
260
 Judge Jones’s interest in reform may be personal—
before her appointment to the bench, she was in private practice 
specializing in bankruptcy cases. 
d. Military Law 
Judges from the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have been 
relatively restrained in their lobbying efforts. The one notable exception 
concerns the United States’ implementation of the Geneva 
Convention.
261
 The United States ratified the Geneva Convention in 
1955, but in 1996 had yet to implement the treaty through legislation. 
The aim of House Bill 2587 in 1996 was to remedy this lack of 
implementation by establishing penalties for certain war crimes, 
including murder and torture against members of the U.S. armed forces 
or U.S. nationals.
262
 H.R. 2587 would have added a provision to the U.S. 
Code providing that 
whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a 
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions where the victim of 
such breach is a member of the Armed Forces of the United 
States or a citizen of the United States shall be fined or 
imprisoned or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also 
be subject to the penalty of death.
263
 
Judge R.O. Everett of the CAAF expressed his support for the 
proposal, but was of the opinion that Congress should go further. Everett 
believed that Congress should make clear that the provision should leave 
jurisdiction for prosecuting violators with military tribunals and not with 
                                                     
imposition of means-testing for upper-income debtors.”). 
259. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2012). 
260. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, pt. 2, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, at 146 (Oct. 29, 1981) (statement of Judge Lee) (testifying before 
Congress about the bankruptcy reforms of 1978). 
261. War Crimes Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 2587 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and 
Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 20 (1996) (statement of the Hon. Robinson 
O. Everett, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces). 
262. Id. at 1 (statement of the Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration and 
Claims).  
263. Id. at 2.  
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other federal courts.
264
 Everett suggested specific language that would 
have clarified that the statute was not a repeal of the jurisdiction enjoyed 
by courts-martial and military commissions under articles eighteen and 
twenty-one of the Uniform Code.
265
 According to Everett, repeal of the 
court’s jurisdiction would result in some cases lacking jurisdiction in any 
court.
266
 
Everett also encouraged Congress to expand the reach of the law. He 
proposed replacing the word “citizen” with the more inclusive 
“national.”267 He suggested including not only violations of the Geneva 
Convention but also violations of several other major treaties entered 
into by the United States, including the Hague Convention and various 
treaties concerned with land mines. In addition, he argued for the 
creation of universal jurisdiction: 
If the heinousness of a crime and its impact on the international 
community have been recognized by treaties into which our 
countries and many others have entered, American courts should 
have jurisdiction over that crime.
268
 
Judge Everett also suggested that articles eighteen and twenty-one of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice be amended specifically to 
empower courts-martial and military commissions to try anyone accused 
of a “grave breach” of any treaty to which H.R. 2587 may refer.269 
Finally, even though he made clear that he was not opposed to the death 
penalty, he explained that as practical matter in the international context, 
including potential death penalty cases would “create[] more problems 
than it’s worth.”270 
Judge Everett’s lobbying efforts are consistent with the lobbying 
efforts that have come from other specialized courts: courts seek to 
consolidate their power by maintaining or expanding their jurisdiction or 
by increasing their influence on the types of reform that are 
implemented. In this way, specialized courts resemble executive 
                                                     
264. Id. at 20–21 (statement of J. R. O. Everett, U.S. Court of Military Appeal for the Armed 
Forces). 
265. Id. at 20–23. 
266. Id. at 20–24.  
267. Id. at 23. 
268. Id. 
269. See H.R. 3680, 104th Cong. (1996) (making it a federal offense to “commit[] a grave breach 
of the Geneva Conventions”). 
270. War Crimes Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 2587 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and 
Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 261, at 1 (statement of the Honorable Lamar 
Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims). 
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administrative agencies, which are thought to seek increased 
responsibilities as a way of maximizing power and influence.
271
 
C. Specialization’s Impact on Judicial Lobbying 
The frequency and depth of lobbying efforts from judges on 
specialized courts is worth studying. To be sure, there are examples of 
generalist judges lobbying on policy matters. For example, as described 
in Section II.B.3.c, Judge Jones (a Fifth Circuit judge) has lobbied 
extensively on bankruptcy reform. Prior to joining the bench, Jones was 
in private practice and specialized in bankruptcy, but as a judge she 
hears a wide range of cases. But the depth of specialized jurist 
involvement in legislative affairs is striking. The Federal Circuit’s 
judges have been, perhaps, the most obvious example of this. Both Chief 
Judge Michel and Chief Judge Rader have been extremely vocal in 
commenting on proposed legislation that would alter the patent statute. 
But specialization’s impact on lobbying is perhaps best exemplified 
by the lobbying of the FISA Court judges. FISA Court judges have been 
extremely active in debating the merits of governmental surveillance.
272
 
Three judges from the court have spoken out strongly on proposed 
legislation, with all three judges disagreeing about the best way to 
approach the issue.
273
 
As to why specialization leads to lobbying, history might provide a 
clue. In 1910, Congress created the Commerce Court of the United 
States.
274
 The court was a specialized court with jurisdiction over cases 
arising from orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
275
 The 
court, while specialized, did not consist of specialized judges, however. 
The judges on the court were appointed for five-year terms, but during 
their service on the court, they simultaneously served as at-large circuit 
judges, sitting as appointed by the Chief Justice.
276
 Upon the completion 
of their terms, they were assigned to one of the circuit courts.
277
 In this 
                                                     
271. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 575–84 (1984) (summarizing arguments for 
administrative enlargement). 
272. See supra section I.B.2. 
273. See supra note 1 (listing three letters from Judge Bates urging strengthening the court’s 
powers); Levy, supra note 248 (recommending modifications to the FISA Court’s jurisdiction); 
Carr, supra note 249 (proposing drastic changes to the surveillance court). 
274. Mann-Elkins Act, 61st Cong., ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (June 18, 1910). 
275. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. George E. Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM. 
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way, the court is similar to the FISA Court in that the judges come from 
non-specialized judicial backgrounds and return to generalist positions at 
the end of their terms. 
The Commerce Court only remained in existence for three years, so 
judges were not offered many opportunities to lobby Congress.
278
 
However, Judge Martin Knapp made two statements, both relating to the 
Erdman Act, an 1898 law that pertained to railroad disputes and which 
provided the bulk of the Commerce Court’s cases. Judge Knapp made 
suggestions about proposed alterations to the Erdman Act in 1912.
279
 
Judge Knapp suggested three main changes to the act.
280
 First, he 
proposed broadening the scope of the law.
281
 Second, he suggested 
simplifying the law by leaving out anything not deemed essential to the 
accomplishment of its purpose.
282
 This included minor changes of 
procedure, designed to give the law greater flexibility, so that it could be 
more readily adapted to varying conditions and different controversies. 
Lastly, he suggested replacing the court’s mediators with a board of 
mediation and conciliation so constituted as to be able to meet the 
increased demand that would result from the proposed extension of the 
law.
283
 In essence, Knapp proposed increasing the jurisdiction of his 
court, simplifying the procedural aspects of the law, and increasing 
administrative positions for his court. He made similar proposals the 
following year.
284
 After the termination of the Commerce Court in 1913, 
he served on the Fourth Circuit until his death in 1923.
285
 
Thus, the Commerce Court provides a historical example of 
specialized adjudication resulting in increased judicial lobbying. Like 
other specialized courts, the lobbying efforts from the Commerce Court 
were focused on jurisdictional expansion: specialized courts tend to seek 
to increase the types of cases that the court hears. Chief Judge Rader of 
                                                     
J. LEGAL HIST. 238 (1964). 
278. Id. 
279. The Erdman Act: Hearing on H.R. 22012 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 62d Cong. 3 (1912) (statement of C.J. Martin A. Knapp, Commerce Court).  
280. Id. at 6–21.  
281. Id. at 7–10. 
282. Id. at 7–13. 
283. Id. at 3. 
284. Arbitration in Controversies Between Employers and Employees: Hearing on S. 2517 Before 
the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 63d Cong. 18–31 (1913) (statement of C.J. Martin A. Knapp, 
Commerce Court). 
285. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, Knapp, Martin Augustine, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet 
/nGetInfo?jid=1293&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na [https://perma.cc/N7J7-7ASK]. 
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the Federal Circuit has also followed this pattern, repeatedly suggesting 
that his court should hear all types of intellectual property disputes, not 
just patent cases and scattered trademark cases.
286
 Section III.B, infra, 
begins to explain how specialization incentivizes judicial lobbying. 
III. REGULATING JUDICIAL LOBBYING BY SPECIALIZED 
JUDGES 
A. What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Judicial Lobbying? 
Although judicial lobbying has its detractors, not all commentators 
believe that it is problematic. James Douglas and Roger Hartley have 
argued that “courts are acting too conservatively in the political 
process.”287 They have argued that norms against judicial lobbying have 
hindered the judiciary in the legislative budgetary process.
288
 For 
Douglas and Hartley, judicial lobbying is an unalloyed good because it 
provides valuable information for legislators about the realities of 
interpreting legislation.
289
 
Neal Katyal takes an intermediate approach with regards to the 
optimal level of judicial lobbying. He urges judges to embrace their role 
as “advice-givers,” but suggests that this role be confined to active cases 
or controversies.
290
 Although Katyal explicitly avoids the question of 
whether judges should weigh in on policy matters,
291
 he does suggest 
that judges have some limited role to play vis-à-vis Congress. He labels 
such judicial advice-giving on policy matters as “prescription.”292 For 
him, prescription should be limited: 
The advantage of prescription is that it permits relatively 
intellectual federal judges with life tenure to impart their 
                                                     
286. See Dennis Crouch, An Open Letter from Judge Rader, PATENTLYO (June 30, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/letter-judge-rader.html [https://perma.cc/UGY5-JPG3] 
(publishing Chief Judge Rader’s statement that he regrets not offering an amendment including 
copyright and trademark cases within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction). 
287. Hartley, supra note 10, at 395; see also Roger E. Hartley & James W. Douglas, Budgeting 
for State Courts: The Perceptions of Key Officials Regarding the Determinants of Budget Success, 
24 JUST. SYS. J. 251, 260 (2003). 
288. See Hartley & Douglas, supra note 287, at 258–60. 
289. Id. 
290. Katyal, supra note 10, at 1716–19 (giving three examples of judicial advice-giving—
“clarification,” “self-alienation,” and “personification”—all of which take place through judicial 
opinion writing). 
291. Id. at 1719 (stating that judges commenting on “policy issues” is not the concern of his 
article). 
292. Id. at 1719.  
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nonbinding wisdom to politicians. Many prescriptive matters are 
routine, such as the annual tradition whereby some Supreme 
Court justices go before Congress and testify about the Court’s 
budget and similar matters. Recommendations to Congress 
about the asbestos litigation crisis may be a less obvious but 
equally valid example of legitimate prescription because courts 
have a special expertise in understanding the nature of the crisis 
and recommending specific solutions. The most tenuous 
prescriptive situations occur when judges expound on matters of 
general policy when they have no structural expertise in the 
subject matter.
293
 
Katyal is concerned here with expertise. If judges have no relevant 
expertise to add to legislative debates, their lobbying efforts do little to 
further interbranch dialogue.
294
 
Despite Douglas’s and Hartley’s views that judicial lobbying is nearly 
universally beneficial, Katyal’s intermediate view of the value of such 
lobbying strikes the correct balance between productive  congressional 
information-gathering and troublesome judicial overreach. The closer 
that judges get to law-makers, the more tenuous the legitimacy of 
judicial decisions becomes.
295
 Judges who lobby against particular laws 
for which they have little expertise are likely to be viewed skeptically 
when required to interpret those laws in court. For example, many critics 
chided Chief Justice Rehnquist for his lobbying efforts against the 
passage of the Violence Against Women Act.
296
 But even more strident 
criticism arose when the court he chaired later struck down portions of 
that Act.
297
 
But specialized courts would seem to overcome Katyal’s concern 
about judicial expertise, at least superficially. Such courts, almost 
                                                     
293. Id. 
294. See Mikva, supra note 94, at 1827 (complaining that judges “don’t have that kind of know-
how” when it comes to selecting between competing policy choices). 
295. See id. at 1829; Scheppele, supra note 157, at 1521 (“As both a coequal branch of 
government and an impartial arbiter of disputes, it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to solicit 
money.”). 
296. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2201 
(1992) (arguing that the Chief Justice’s actions were inappropriate). 
297. See, e.g., Benjamin Black, Note: The Strange Career of VAWA: Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
the Shift from “Political” to “Constitutional” Federalism 1990–2000, 16 J.L. & POL. 499, 515–17 
(2000) (arguing on federalism grounds that the Chief Justice overstepped his jurisdiction); Sally F. 
Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Uses and Abuses of 
Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 70–75 (2003) (same); Resnik, supra note 41, at 275–78 
(arguing that the Chief Justice lobbied against the Violence against Women Act). 
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assuredly, have expertise in their given subject matter.
298
 Objections to 
specialized judicial lobbying therefore must rely on something more 
than critiques of the value of judicial input. But specialized court 
lobbying may pose even greater risks than generalized court lobbying. 
The Federal Circuit experience again provides an example. In a closely 
watched case—referred to as the Myriad299 case—the Southern District 
of New York invalidated a patent on the BRCA1 gene, a gene mutation 
that greatly increases a woman’s risk of breast cancer. The district judge 
in Myriad invalidated the patent for lacking the requisite “patent-eligible 
subject matter”—essentially that genes were not patentable because they 
were laws of nature.
300
 
Before oral argument at the Federal Circuit, Chief Judge Rader sat on 
a panel of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), an industry 
organization that often features Federal Circuit judges.
301
 During the 
panel discussion, Chief Judge Rader critiqued the law of patent-eligible 
subject matter, suggesting that it was “subjective, and, to be frank, it’s 
politics. It’s what you believe in your soul, but it isn’t the law.”302 The 
winning plaintiffs in the Myriad case filed a motion to have Chief Judge 
Rader recused from the appellate panel (which had yet to be 
assigned).
303
 They argued that Chief Judge Rader’s comments 
“expressed his views on this specific case,” and “did so in front of an 
audience that was heavily biased in favor of one party.”304 The Federal 
Circuit denied the motion, but Chief Judge Rader did not ultimately 
appear on the panel that reversed the district court’s decision.305 
Federal judges that comment on policy matters invariably run the risk 
of prejudicing, or appearing to prejudice, future cases. But that risk is 
much higher for specialized courts that hear a high volume of cases in 
                                                     
298. The Federal Circuit is less of a specialized court and more of a centralized court. Ultimately, 
the expertise of a centralized court should exceed that of a generalist court. 
299. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad), 702 F. Supp. 
2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
300. Id. at 183. 
301. John T. Aquino, Finding Gene Patents Unpatentable Too Blunt an Approach, Panelists Say, 
BNA’S PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 47 (May 14, 2010). 
302. Id. 
303. Motion by Plaintiffs-Appellees for Recusal of Chief Judge Randall R. Rader at 6, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 
2010–1406). 
304. Id. 
305. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), remanded to 467 Fed. App’x 890 (2012) (J. Lourie, 
Bryson, and Moore). 
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their specialized subject area. Indeed, Chief Judge Michel’s letter to 
Congress urging restraint on patent damage reform greatly impacted the 
outcome of pending cases.
306
 He repeatedly urged Congress to leave 
damages reform to the court, while simultaneously urging litigants to 
challenge particular sorts of damage calculations.
307
 Congress delayed 
debate on damage reform pending the then-upcoming case of Microsoft 
v. Lucent.
308
 With such a highly watched case—both by litigants and 
congressmen—the Federal Circuit took the opportunity to do precisely 
what Chief Judge Michel had promised: update the law of patent 
damages in the court rather than legislatively.
309
 In an opinion authored 
by Chief Judge Michel, Lucent significantly altered the evidence 
required to award damages in patent cases.
310
 Of course, using individual 
cases as vehicles for achieving political goals comes at a cost. 
Commentators, not to mention Lucent, whose jury damage award was 
overturned, felt that case was largely a political decision, not a legal 
one.
311
 These sorts of quasi-legislative judicial actions threaten the 
judiciary’s reputation for fairness and evenhandedness. 
Furthermore, lobbying by the judiciary implicates concerns of 
capture.
312
 Judges are very successful when they lobby Congress about 
pending legislation, especially specialized judges with specialized 
expertise.
313
 For example, the America Invents Act was shaped, in large 
part, by judicial lobbying efforts.
314
 The success of judicial lobbying is 
likely to attract special interests. To the extent that the judiciary engages 
                                                     
306. See Letter from Paul R. Michel to Patrick Leahy & Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 219; Letter 
from Paul R. Michel to Shanna A. Winters, supra note 227. 
307. See Michel, supra note 219 at 2.  
308. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. (Microsoft v. Lucent), 580 F.3d 1301, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
309. Id. at 1327–31. For more on patent injunctions (as opposed to money damages), see Sarah 
W. Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AMERICAN U. L. REV. 733, 751–58 (2012). 
310. Id. at 1327–35. 
311. See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 655, 662 n.34 (2009) (critiquing the Lucent case as “confus[ing] the entire market 
value rule with the question of royalty base”). 
312. For a full treatment of the topic of capture of courts, see J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture 
(forthcoming 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
313. See Harvey Rishikof & Barbara A. Perry, “Separateness but Interdependence, Autonomy but 
Reciprocity”: A First Look at Federal Judges’ Appearances Before Legislative Committees, 46 
MERCER L. REV. 667, 669–75 (1995) (finding that Congress nearly always took the advice of judges 
when lobbying on issues of judicial functioning). 
314. See J. Jonas Anderson, Congress as Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 
AM. U. L. REV. 961, 962–69 (2014) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s lobbying efforts shaped 
Congress’s approach to patent reform). 
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in lobbying on substantive policy matters, they risk being coopted by 
private lobbying organizations. This risk is heightened for specialized 
courts, which are already thought to be more prone to capture than 
generalist courts.
315
 
B. Specialization’s Role in Judicial Lobbying 
Why do judges, particularly specialized judges, lobby? This section 
theorizes three key differences between the ways that specialist judges 
and generalist judges view the legislative process. These differences may 
help explain the prominent role that specialized judges often take in 
legislative battles. 
1. Expertise 
The concept of specialization is often conflated with expertise. While 
the two terms are not synonyms, there are good reasons to suspect that 
specialized judges gain valuable expertise in their subject matter.
316
 
Judges who hear hundreds of cases within a particular field are more 
likely to develop strategies for effectively adjudicating disputes than 
judges who hear only a handful of such cases. This adjudicative 
expertise can prove extremely valuable for legislators, particularly when 
proposed legislation involves aspects of judicial procedure. Indeed, 
Congress nearly always seeks input from the judiciary when considering 
statutory changes to the judicial system.
317
 Judges are often called to 
testify during legislative debates surrounding changes to the judicial 
system.
318
 Also, they are frequently appointed by Congress to sit on 
committees or commissions to review court reform proposals.
319
 
In addition to the generalized adjudicatory knowledge that judges 
develop, Congress tends to view judges on specialized courts as experts 
in the substantive policy that those courts review.
320
 This is less true for 
                                                     
315. See Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984?: An Essay 
on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 775–91 (1983). 
316. See John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two 
Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV 553, 555 (2010) (describing the Federal Circuit’s 
“exclusive hold” over its specialized caseload).  
317. See Rishikof & Perry, supra note 313, at 669–75 (finding that Congress nearly always took 
the advice of judges when lobbying on issues of judicial functioning).  
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
320. Consider that Congress often calls bankruptcy judges to testify about proposed reform. See, 
e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 PENN. L. REV. 631, 636 (2015) 
(chronicling the formation of the Federal Circuit and how Congress intended the court to function as 
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generalist courts. Congress often seeks input from specialized judges 
when reviewing the statutory regime governed by those judges. 
Conversely, generalist judges are usually called to testify before 
Congress about more court-specific matters.
321
 
Congressional reliance on specialized judicial input is not unique to 
Article III judges. Congress is quite open to hearing from bankruptcy 
judges about substantive changes to the bankruptcy statute.
322
 Similarly, 
tax court judges are often called to testify about updates of the tax 
code.
323
 These are not examples of judges testifying about the impact of 
legislation on the courts. Instead, these are instances of Congress looking 
to the courts for substantive policy guidance.
324
 Clearly, Congress views 
specialized judges (whether administrative courts or not) as having 
valuable insight not only about the process of adjudication, but about the 
substantive goals of legislation in their jurisdictional area.
325
 
Judges on specialized courts tend to view themselves as policy 
specialists as well.
326
 Opinions from the Federal Circuit routinely refer to 
Congress’s mandate to the court to “promote a uniform interpretation” of 
the patent laws.
327
 Former Chief Judge Rader has been known to 
criticize the Supreme Court for misunderstanding patent law.
328
 Thus, 
                                                     
“an expert” court). 
321. Rishikof & Perry, supra note 313, at 679–80 (finding that of 275 known instances of judicial 
testimony, 125 addressed “court administration”). 
322. For instance, in March of 2014, Judge Sontchi testified before Congress regarding two 
issues. He testified that the safe harbor for derivatives was too broad and also urged Congress to 
eliminate the safe harbors for repurchase agreements. Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, 
Commercial and Antitrust Law, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 26, 2014) (statement of the 
Honorable Christopher S. Sontchi, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Delaware ).  
323. If judged by number of appearances, the judges of the tax court are particularly useful to 
Congress. See, e.g., Review of the Civil Penalty Provisions Contained in the Internal Revenue Code: 
Hearings on Recommendations for Civil Tax Penalty Reform and H.R. 2528 Before the Subcomm. 
on Oversight of H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 101st Cong. 1 (1989). 
324. Id. 
325. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 67–68 (1997) (“[I]t might be useful 
for judges with experience in interpreting statutes to testify as to the technical difficulty in 
discerning congressional meaning.”). 
326. Laura G. Pedraza-Farina, Understanding the Federal Circuit: A Model of Expert Decision-
Making, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Pedraza-
Farina_Laura_IPSC_paper_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ98-R9U7]. 
327. See Hyatt v. Doll, 576 F.3d 1246, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Congress created this court to 
promote a uniform interpretation of the patent laws.”) (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 
874, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); but see Lisa L. Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 
111–12 (2015) (critiquing patent law’s goal of uniformity and proposing that the patent system 
embrace more “patent experimentalism”). 
328. See Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Rader on the Supreme Court and Judge Posner, 
IPWATCHDOG (June 28, 2015, 11:21 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com [https://perma.cc/E3R3-
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the perception—shared by Congress and the court—of specialized 
courts’ policy expertise likely drives much of specialized judicial 
lobbying. While most judges are not experts in any particular area other 
than adjudication, specialized judges come to be viewed and to view 
themselves as experts in their specialized field.
329
 Indeed, the judges on 
the FISA Court who have lobbied for surveillance reform have engaged 
in very little lobbying as district judges. It would appear that being a 
member of a specialized court bestows a perception of specialized 
knowledge on judges. 
The difference in perceived value of specialized versus non-
specialized judicial input also helps explain the relative dearth of 
lobbying by generalist judges. Generalist courts have played prominent 
roles in lobbying for and against changes to circuit court boundaries and 
legislation about court administration.
330
 Judges rightly consider 
themselves experts on such matters. No one has more experience with 
court organization and procedural rules than judges. Congress has also 
been very responsive when judges weigh in on such matters.
331
 Such 
responsiveness indicates that Congress shares the judges’ view of 
themselves as experts in adjudication. 
2. Specialized Docket 
Beyond specialization, specialized courts may also lobby for 
legislative change because the impact of that change is more acutely felt 
on specialized courts. For example, the Federal Circuit was very active 
in legislative lobbying during the recent legislative patent reform 
precisely because of the potential impact that legislation would have had 
on the workings of the court.
332
 Legislative changes to the patent system 
fundamentally impact the members of the federal circuit.
333
 For example, 
legislative changes to damages law would have impacted a great number 
                                                     
4ATQ]. 
329. For proof, look no further than the Tax Court judges, who often are called to testify before 
Congress as experts. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 573, 600–07 (2006) (discussing patent cases dealing with subject matter from juice machines 
to biological research at the Federal Circuit). 
330. See supra section II.B. 
331. Smith, supra note 10, at 190. 
332. See Anderson, supra note 314, at 1014–17 (arguing that the Federal Circuit was interested in 
patent reform because such reform would have an impact on the court). 
333. See Michel, supra note 227, at 2 (stating that proposed changes would “require[] a massive 
damages trail in every case” and “the meaning of various phrases in the bills would be litigated for 
many years”).  
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of the court’s cases.334 Thus, lobbying makes sense for a court looking to 
protect its domination over patent law. 
The same is less true of generalist courts. Those courts usually do not 
feel the same impact when legislative changes occur because their 
docket is much more diverse than the docket of specialized courts.
335
 For 
generalist judges, it is usually not worth the effort to lobby for statutory 
change because the number of cases an individual judge receives in any 
particular legal area is relatively small. Thus, a judge with strong views 
about copyright law is unlikely to put forth the effort required to 
influence Congress because he or she will only see a handful of 
copyright cases, if any, in a given year.
336
 Of course, this is less true in 
areas in which generalist courts see a large number of cases. And it is 
often in those areas that produce large volumes of cases that generalist 
courts actively lobby Congress.
337
 For instance, generalist judges hear 
hundreds of criminal drug cases every year and have thus made 
sentencing guidelines for criminal cases—particularly for drug 
offenses—a lobbying priority.338 
3. Conflation of Judicial Administration and Policy 
For specialized courts, altering the scope of the law implicitly alters 
the administrative burden of judging. New laws can lead to special 
administrative burdens for specialized courts as they struggle to handle a 
greatly enhanced caseload.
339
 In this way, the traditional dividing line 
between “judicial-” and “policy-” based legislation, while always blurry, 
completely evaporates for specialized courts.
340
 Changes in policy can 
                                                     
334. Id. 
335. See Douglas A. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Courts: Specialists Versus 
Generalists, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 788, 789–90 (2013) (comparing the United States, where 
fewer than one percent of court cases involve questions of antitrust, to India, where all antitrust 
disputes are heard by specialist judges).  
336. The exception to that generally applicable rule is the case of Judge Wiley Y. Daniel, who 
had 298 copyright filings in 2013 and 197 filings in 2014. This appears to be the result of various 
suits against people accused of illegally downloading movies. For more information about copyright 
litigation, see generally Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
1105 (2015); Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. District Courts: 1994 to 2014, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
(forthcoming).  
337. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1276, 1281–86 (2005) (listing those lobbying for and against sentencing reform). 
338. See id. 
339. See supra note 325 and accompanying text. 
340. For examples in which policy-based reforms have a jurisdictional affect, see Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1495–1500 (2012). For an 
example of how the Supreme Court can alter the power of a specialized court, see J. Jonas 
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also result in jurisdictional changes for specialized courts.
341
 
The conflation of administration and policy on specialized courts can 
also insulate those courts’ lobbying actions from criticism. Specialized 
judges couch their critiques of policy in administrative terms. Consider 
the Federal Circuit’s Chief Judge Michel writing to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee about patent reform.
342
 Although many of the issues he was 
concerned about were fundamentally about policy choices—i.e. how 
patent damages should be calculated and whether claim construction 
should be appealable before final judgment—he framed his concerns as 
administrative ones.
343
 In his view, allowing claim construction appeals 
would overwhelm the Federal Circuit with new appeals.
344
 This is an 
administrative complaint, but it goes to a fundamental policy issue about 
how and when claim construction is conducted and reviewed on appeal. 
Similarly, he argued that judges were administratively incapable of 
calculating damage awards under Congress’s proposed regime.345 This is 
a critique about the basic calculation of patent damages, framed in the 
language of administration. 
Similarly, Judge Bates’s critiques of the USA Freedom Act were, on 
their face, administrative ones. In his view, allowing a third-party 
advocate to take a position opposite the government in every case would 
have been wasteful and led to unnecessarily prolonged trials.
346
 This is 
an administrative complaint. But the legislative debate is about a key 
policy issue: how much discretion the government should have to 
monitor its citizens’ communications. At specialized courts, these policy 
issues overlap with administrative concerns. Thus, the norms against 
judicial lobbying rarely, if ever, apply for specialized courts. 
Similar overlaps exist in legislative debates about jurisdiction and 
                                                     
Anderson, Specialized Standards of Review, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 151 (2015).  
341. See id. 
342. See notes 219–227 and accompanying text. 
343. See Letter from Paul R. Michel to Shanna A. Winters, supra note 227, at 2 (suggesting that 
changes to damages law would be “extremely costly and time-consuming”); Letter from Paul R. 
Michel to Patrick Leahy & Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 219, at 1 (suggesting that altering the law 
regarding claim construction would bog the court down in new cases). 
344. See Letter from Paul R. Michel to Patrick Leahy & Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 219, at 1–2 
(arguing against changes to claim construction doctrine because they would slow down the Federal 
Circuit’s work). 
345. See Letter from Paul R. Michel to Shanna A. Winters, supra note 227, at 2 (suggesting that 
changes to damages law would be “extremely costly and time-consuming”). 
346. See Letter from John Bates to Dianne Feinstein, supra note 1, at 2 (claiming that the 
proposed legislation was unnecessary); Letter from John Bates to Patrick Leahy, supra note 1, at 2 
(same); Letter from John D. Bates to Barack Obama, supra note 211 (same). 
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policy. Congress usually engages with the judiciary when it considers 
changes to jurisdictional rules.
347
 Jurisdictional rules define which sorts 
of disputes are appropriate to bring within a particular court, and which 
are not.
348
 For specialized courts, like the Federal Circuit, jurisdiction is 
defined by subject matter, not geography.
349
 Thus, when Congress 
contemplates altering substantive law in an area supervised by a 
specialized court, it simultaneously must contemplate the jurisdictional 
consequences of such an action. Indeed, recent changes to the patent 
statute have seriously altered the types and number of cases that arrive at 
the Federal Circuit.
350
 This change in the court’s docket is the result of 
the America Invents Act creating a host of new post-issuance 
proceedings at the Patent and Trademark Office.
351
 These proceedings 
have proven exceedingly popular with litigants and have diverted some 
litigation from the courts.
352
 Thus when Congress threatens to make 
jurisdictional decisions, specialized courts may rightly feel that they 
must lobby Congress if those decisions threaten the court’s docket. 
C. Placing Limits on Lobbying Activities by Judges 
The success of judicial lobbying has not been ignored by 
academics.
353
 When judges lobby—particularly when the judicial branch 
                                                     
347. See generally Larry Kramer, The One-Eyed Are Kings: Improving Congress’ Ability to 
Regulate the Use of Judicial Resources, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 72, 79 (1991) (referring to the 
Administrative Office’s mission as “seeking to advance the particular agenda of . . . the judicial 
branch[]”); Winkle III, supra note 40, at 264–68 (1985) (chronicling a case of jurisdictional reform 
that was guided by judges); John W. Winkle III, Judges Before Congress: Reform Politics and 
Individual Freedom, 22 POLITY 443, 446–53 (describing judicial testimony before Congress on 
jurisdictional reform legislation). 
348. For example, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is defined at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). 
349. Id. 
350. Consider that an “explosion” in patent suits (if not individual defendants, see Christopher A. 
Cortropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities, 99 MINN. L. REV. 649 (2014) (finding that the 
explosion was due to a change in joinder rules)) occurred after the America Invents Act. See GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY, GAO 13–465 (2013), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQG2-YCJV] (finding a thirty-one 
percent increase in patent infringement filings from 2010 to 2011).  
351. See Paul M. Janicke, Overview of the New Patent Law of the United States, 21 TEXAS 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 63, 67–72 (2013) (providing an overview of the changes to the post-grant review 
procedures). 
352. See Coleen Chien & Christian Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post Grant 
Review, STAN. TECH. L. REV. at *3–*4 (forthcoming) (finding that the first year of post-grant review 
saw a 130-fold increase in filings over the last years of inter partes reexamination).  
353. See Smith, supra note 10, at 190 (discussing the effectiveness of the unified judiciary before 
Congress). 
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lobbies with one voice—Congress listens.354 Judges hold a special 
prestige among lawmakers; they are often asked to testify on matters of 
congressional interest.
355
 The judiciary’s view on legislative reform 
influences Congress for a number of reasons. First, federal judges have 
life tenure and are restricted in their sources of income.
356
 Thus it is 
thought that views of the judiciary are generally less biased than other 
lobbying entities that might be seeking financial gain or improved career 
prospects.
357
 Second, judges are considered experts in statutory 
interpretation; therefore, their input on statutory language is often 
welcomed.
358
 Third, a judge’s job naturally exposes the judge to areas of 
the law that may be in need of modification.
359
 
Despite the appeal of judicial input, given the potential downsides of 
judicial lobbying, discussed in section IV.A, supra, there may be 
instances in which judicial lobbying should be restricted.
360
 This section 
will analyze three potential avenues of limiting judicial lobbying: 
changing the ethical standards for judges as lobbyists, centralizing 
judicial lobbying in judicial organizations, and centralizing only 
specialized courts’ lobbying efforts.361 
Ultimately, this section concludes that the potential benefits of 
judicial input in the legislative process outweigh the costs of such 
lobbying.
362
 However, there is one area of judicial lobbying in which 
some restrictive measures are advisable: that of specialized courts. 
                                                     
354. Id. 
355. Id. 
356. See Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Perspective, 32 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1269 (2005) (“Moreover, not only is the judicial salary the same for all 
district judges—there are no bonuses for outstanding performance—but a judge’s ability to cash in 
on his judicial reputation by moonlighting as a teacher or lecturer is very limited . . . .”). 
357. Id. (“It seems, then, that the federal judicial career has been carefully designed to insulate 
the judges from the normal incentives and constraints that determine the behavior of rational 
actors . . . .”). 
358. See generally Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 866–71 (1930) 
(debunking the myth that judges are proficient at statutory interpretation); Nicholas S. Zeppos, 
Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 357 (1990) (contrasting 
“traditional” statutory interpretation from the “unique” interpretation done in United States v. Jin 
Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916)). 
359. See Geyh, supra note 10, at 1222–24 (discussing the exposure to federal issues that federal 
judges enjoy). 
360.  See Kelso, supra note 28, at 855 (“Once it is admitted that some extrajudicial speech by 
judges on legal topics is both permissible, desirable, and necessary, but that not all such speech is 
advisable, it becomes problematic to draw a line to distinguish the acceptable from the 
unacceptable.” (emphasis in original)). 
361. Id. 
362. See Hartley, supra note 10, at 405–06 (discussing the advantages of lobbying). 
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Specialized courts face unique bureaucratic pressures that incentivize 
lobbying by judges in ways that are harmful to the legal system.
363
 
Specialized court lobbying also frequently occurs without opposing 
viewpoints from non-specialized courts.
364
 
Specialized courts often have expertise in particular legal areas, 
however.
365
 Therefore completely eliminating specialized lobbying is 
less than ideal. Instead, this section outlines a means of funneling 
judicial lobbying to a centralized body, such as the Judicial Conference. 
Directing lobbying efforts through to a centralized body provides a 
check on specialized court lobbying while still leveraging the beneficial 
input that a specialized judiciary can provide to legislators. 
1. Change Ethical Standards 
Perhaps the most obvious way to reign in judicial lobbying is to 
change the ethical standards which regulate extra-judicial speech.
366
 
Commentators have argued that Canon 4 of the Judicial Code of Ethics 
restricts judges from opining on legislative issues that are unrelated to 
the judiciary, but the Comptroller General has not agreed.
367
 Canon 4 
could easily be amended to more explicitly restrict extra-judicial speech 
by judges.
368
 Modifying Canon 4(A)(2) could be done thusly, with the 
proposed modifications appearing in bold: 
2. Consulting. A judge may consult with or appear at a public 
hearing before an executive or legislative body or official, but 
only when invited to do so or 
(a) on matters of direct relevance to the judiciary as a whole; 
(b) to the extent that it would generally be perceived that a 
judge’s judicial experience provides special expertise in the 
area; or 
(c) when the judge is acting pro se in a matter involving 
the judge or the judge’s interest 
                                                     
363. See Dreyfuss, supra note 215, at 5–7 (listing the potential drawbacks to specialized courts). 
364. See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 
1755, 1766 (1997) (finding that the Federal Circuit does not face intellectual competition). 
365. See Golden, supra note 316, at 557 (acknowledging the Federal Circuit’s and the D.C. 
Circuit’s expertise).  
366. See supra section III.B. 
367. See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 10, at 1203–04 (highlighting the Comptroller General’s role in 
lobbying restrictions). 
368. For instance, it could be amended to explicitly outlaw certain types of judicial speech that 
was found to endanger fairness. 
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Such explicit restrictions on judicial speech, however, encounter two 
primary counter-arguments: one constitutional and one practical. Any 
restriction on speech is likely to be challenged on First Amendment 
grounds.
369
 Judges enjoy the same First Amendment speech rights as 
regular citizens.
370
 Thus, completely forbidding judicial speech on 
political matters appears to be a clear violation of those rights.
371
 
Constitutional problems aside, using ethical standards to restrict 
judicial lobbying poses a practical problem: blanket restrictions on 
judicial input in legislative matters limit one of the most effective 
sources of information for lawmakers.
372
 Judges often have keen insights 
into the operation of the law, even in areas unrelated to management of 
the judicial system.
373
 Because judges regularly encounter thorny issues 
of statutory interpretation and are forced to infer the legislature’s intent 
in drafting statutes, they can readily identify problematic legal areas for 
Congress to consider amending. Oftentimes, this dialogue about 
lawmaking occurs through the formal processes of law-creation 
(legislating) and law-interpretation (judging).
374
 But this dialogue need 
not always be formal. There may be occasions where a more informal 
process of dialogue could serve the law-making process more 
effectively.
375
 
Thus, blanket restrictions on judicial lobbying are likely to lead to less 
effective law-making. Judges provide unique insights into the American 
legal system.
376
 Eliminating their input would severely hamper 
legislative efforts to improve the administration and functioning of the 
law. Judges also often provide Congress with less-partisan input than do 
private lobbyists. 
                                                     
369. See Leonard E. Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and the First Amendment, 36 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 1181, 1190–99 (1986) (discussing the various implications of restricting judicial speech).  
370. Id. at 1261. 
371. See id. at 1196–97; Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An 
Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 309–12 (1978) 
(proposing restrictions on political speech). 
372. See Reinhart, supra note 103, at 805 (urging judges to “educate” the public about matters of 
particular expertise).  
373. Id. 
374. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 13 (1970). 
375. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 1097–1106 (listing examples of less formal dialogue 
between the branches). 
376. See Reinhart, supra note 103, at 805 (urging judges to “educate” the public about matters of 
particular expertise). 
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2. Centralize Judicial Lobbying Activities 
As an alternative to absolute or partial limitations on the amount of 
judicial lobbying that can take place, there are good reasons to consider 
centralizing judicial lobbying activities in a single organization. The 
most logical organization would be the Judicial Conference, which 
currently engages in lobbying activities for the judiciary and is headed 
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
377
 The Judicial Conference 
has a long history of dialogue between the judicial and legislative 
branches.
378
 
Among the advantages of centralizing judicial lobbying is that it 
would force the judiciary to speak with one voice on issues that impact 
federal judges. Currently, the judiciary uses the Judicial Conference to 
voice its opinion on matters that directly impact judicial pay, 
jurisdiction, and institutions.
379
 For example, the Judicial Conference has 
been on the forefront of lobbying for increased judicial salaries, going so 
far as to bring a suit against the United States government.
380
 
Going a step further and restricting judicial lobbying activities to 
those of the Judicial Conference would require the judiciary to focus its 
lobbying efforts on those issues that are of particular importance. 
Controversial policy positions would be unlikely to garner enough 
support to be pushed through the Judicial Center.
381
 Furthermore, 
individual spats between judges (even judges on the same court) would 
largely be shielded from the public’s view.382 
But there are a number of downsides to consolidating lobbying 
power. First, doing so elevates the power and status of the Judicial 
Center, an organization which is not subject to direct voter oversight. 
Granting veto power over lobbying to the institution might increase the 
bureaucratic tendency to increase power and control at the expense of 
                                                     
377. Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989 
(1996). 
378. Id. at 993–95 (describing the interactions that take place between the judiciary and Congress 
as a result of the Judicial Conference’s activities). 
379. See Richard L. Vining & Teena Wilhelm, The Chief Justice as Advocate-in-Chief, 95 
JUDICATURE 267, 268–75 (2012) (reviewing Chief Justice Robert’s time as head of the judicial 
conference). 
380. Beer v. United States, 696 F.3d 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that federal judges were 
entitled to back pay and cost-of-living adjustments). 
381. Compare that to the situation in which Judge Kozinzki and Judge Bates were publically in 
disagreement. Compare Letter from John Bates to Patrick Leahy, supra note 1, with Letter from 
Alex Kozinski to Patrick Leahy, supra note 6. 
382. As occurred on the FISA court recently. See Carr, supra note 249; Levy, supra note 248. 
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sound policy.
383
 
Second, the Judicial Center is largely controlled by the Supreme 
Court, in particular by the Chief Justice.
384
 Previous Chief Justices as 
well as the current one have come under attack for their use of the 
Judicial Center’s lobbying function.385 If all judicial lobbying were 
centralized, there would be more opportunity for judicial grand-standing 
and politicking. 
But perhaps most troubling would be the potential elimination of the 
feedback loop between the judiciary and the legislature. Because judges 
are familiar with various aspects of the law, their insight is very valuable 
to lawmakers across the political spectrum.
386
 Silencing individual 
judges under the larger Judicial Center bureaucracy threatens the less 
formal conversations that take place between the legislative and judicial 
branches.
387
 While it certainly may be beneficial to limit the instances in 
which judges engage in judicial lobbying, any such limitations should be 
done on a more fine-grained level. Policy makers should seek to limit 
judicial lobbying in the instances in which there are significant 
downsides to such lobbying, while encouraging judicial-legislative 
dialogue in all other instances.
388
 
3. Checking Lobbying by Specialized Courts 
A more sensible approach to restrictions on judicial lobbying involves 
a means of ensuring that specialized courts speak for the judiciary as a 
whole, and not just for their court’s interests. Lobbying by specialized 
judges has numerous benefits. Specialized judges are thought to possess 
specialized legal knowledge in ways that generalist judges are not.
389
 
                                                     
383. Russell Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial Administration: Creating 
the Federal Judicial Center, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 44 (1988) (“With its increased size, 
however, the Conference became in many ways a non-deliberative body to validate committee 
recommendations, giving the committees considerable power to shape Conference policy on matters 
such as legislation.”). 
384. Id. at 44–45 (describing the increased influence of the Chief Justice during Earl Warren’s 
tenure).  
385. Vining & Wilhelm, supra note 379, at 268–75 (detailing Chief Justice Roberts’ role with the 
Judicial Center); Resnik, supra note 41, at 270–75 (chronicling Chief Justice Rehnquist’s impact on 
VAWA); Goldfarb, supra note 297, 70–75 (criticizing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s conduct with 
regards to VAWA). 
386. Rishikof & Perry, supra note 313, at 669–75. 
387. Hartley, supra note 10, at 405–06 (discussing the advantages of judicial-legislative 
dialogue). 
388. Id. 
389. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 364, at 1766 (assuming that specialized judges are more 
knowledgeable in their subject matter that generalist judges). 
04 - Anderson.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016  3:50 PM 
2016] JUDICIAL LOBBYING 457 
 
Specialized judges oversee a diverse range of legal areas, including tax, 
patents, bankruptcy, governmental employee benefits, and military 
justice.
390
 That expertise can prove very valuable to legislators who have 
little experience with a particular area of the law.
391
 
But lobbying by specialized judges has drawbacks that threaten 
judicial legitimacy. These drawbacks center on perhaps the primary 
concern of any specialized court: capture.
392
 Opponents of specialized 
courts have long noted the potential for specialized court capture.
393
 
Capture in this sense refers to a court aligning its interests with those of 
its constituents.
394
 Capture concerns are greater for specialized courts 
than for generalist ones because the litigants in specialized courts are 
often repeat players who have a long term interest in gaining influence at 
the court.
395
 At the same time, courts may feel the need to please those 
repeat players in order to justify the court’s existence and to expand (or 
maintain) the court’s jurisdiction and power.396 
Concerns about specialized judicial capture raise doubts about both 
the even-handedness of the court’s lobbying efforts as well as the true 
source of the policy opinions expressed during lobbying. Specialized 
courts may be encouraged by frequent litigants to assert a particular 
policy position publically, a position that may benefit the litigant more 
than the public.
397
 Interestingly, specialized courts may do the reverse as 
well: employing litigants to lobby on behalf of the court. Such was the 
case when the Federal Circuit asked the patent bar to urge Congress to 
leave patent reform to the court.
398
 Such a symbiotic lobbying 
relationship between bar and bench is symptomatic of the capture 
worries expressed by specialized court skeptics. 
                                                     
390. Some of those judges, obviously, are Article I judges, including tax, military affairs and 
bankruptcy judges. See 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (2012) (establishing the tax court); 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1295(a)(4), (a)(9) (giving the Federal Circuit control over patent appeals and government 
employee appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (stating that bankruptcy judges hear cases filed in federal 
district court). 
391. See Rishikof & Perry, supra note 313. 
392. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 
U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1147–53 (1990) (discussing capture as the preeminent concern in the creation 
of specialized courts). 
393. Id. 
394. Id. 
395. Id. 
396. Id. 
397. See RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 156–57 (1985) (discussing capture concerns). 
398. See J. Jonas Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 
AMER. U. L. REV. 961, 999–1000 (detailing Chief Judge Michel’s effort to use the bar to lobby 
Congress). 
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Furthermore, because the scope of specialized courts is defined by 
subject matter and not geography, policy pronouncements from 
specialized courts are indistinguishable from efforts to increase the 
court’s jurisdiction and power.399 Thus, skepticism is appropriate when 
specialized courts argue for expanded legal protections in the areas over 
which the court has jurisdiction. For example, a substantive change in 
the bankruptcy law fundamentally impacts the workings of the 
bankruptcy courts.
400
 Similarly, wholesale changes to the patent statute 
have clear and direct consequences at the Federal Circuit.
401
 This 
marriage of the administration of justice with substantive policy allows 
specialized judges to couch their lobbying efforts in the acceptable 
language of judicial efficiency.
402
 For specialized courts, jurisdiction and 
policy overlap in ways that muddy the already murky distinctions 
between lobbying on policy issues and lobbying on judicial issues. Such 
a conflation of policy-type debates with judicial-efficiency-type debates 
is endemic in specialized courts. 
Moreover, specialized court lobbying is much less likely to be 
checked by other judges. When generalist judges lobby for substantive 
policy changes, they are often rebuked by other judges or contradicted in 
their views.
403
 These alternative judicial viewpoints provide members of 
Congress with valuable counter-arguments which may help in 
determining the best policy solution. On the other hand, specialized 
courts often have no competing court with which to debate policy.
404
 For 
instance, since all military appeals are funneled through the Court of the 
Armed Forces, no federal judges outside of that court have expertise 
handling such appeals.
405
 Thus, lobbying efforts from centralized 
appellate courts often lack the critical review of other judges. 
Perhaps most troubling, judicial lobbying by specialized judges poses 
an increased risk that lobbying efforts will bias the judicial process.
406
 
Lobbying efforts often entrench parties in their policy views. Taking 
                                                     
399. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1791, 1864 (2013) (speculating that the Federal Circuit has unique incentives to enhance its powers 
in certain areas).  
400. See Countryman, supra note 147, at 42–45 (expressing skepticism that the bankruptcy courts 
could handle the changes brought about by the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code). 
401. Anderson, supra note 16, at 1075–76. 
402. See supra section III.C. 
403. Compare the experience of the Ninth Circuit debating proposals to divide the circuit. See 
supra section II.B.1.a. 
404. Wood, supra note 364, at 1766. 
405. 10 U.S.C. §§ 810–946 (2012). 
406. See, e.g., Tarkington, supra note 159, at 373–79 (discussing the downsides of judicial bias). 
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positions that might impact or signal the outcome of future cases is the 
primary concern of opponents of judicial lobbying.
407
 But for specialized 
courts, lobbying about policy is almost certain to impact future cases.
408
 
By the very nature of specialized courts, judges encounter a large 
number of specific cases and gain expertise in that area.
409
 When judges 
weigh in on the particular policy debates of the day, those judges almost 
necessarily will see cases that contain those issues in short order.
410
 
Thus, judicial lobbying by specialized courts raises numerous concerns 
about the potential for bias and capture. 
At the same time, input from specialized judges is extremely valuable 
when Congress is considering alterations to the statutes that such courts 
oversee.
411
 Therefore, it is necessary to constrain problematic lobbying 
by specialized judges without eliminating the input that such judges can 
provide.
412
 A mechanism for providing judicial perspective on potential 
statutory updates that simultaneously checks capture and bias concerns 
is the best solution for regulating specialized judicial lobbying. 
Lobbying by specialized judges should therefore be conducted more 
formally than the ad hoc manner in which most current judicial lobbying 
occurs.
413
 The Judicial Conference could bring a semblance of 
organization to judicial lobbying efforts. The Judicial Conference enjoys 
broad participation by judges from all over the country.
414
 These judges 
serve on a “network of committees” which could be utilized in vetting 
specialized court lobbying proposals.
415
 
Some sort of oversight from the judiciary as a whole (not necessarily 
from the Judicial Center) is needed. First, oversight ensures that judicial 
lobbying will take into account the larger legal universe in which the 
                                                     
407. See Kelso, supra note 28, at 856–57 (arguing that judges shouldn’t speak publically on 
issues that may arise in order to avoid “hopelessly compromis[ing] the integrity and impartiality of 
the court for which she works”).  
408. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 1069–76 (discussing changes to the Patent Act and 
implications for the Federal Circuit). 
409. See Golden, supra note 316, at 557. 
410. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 1083–87 (giving as an example of reform the court getting a 
case one month after proposed reform). 
411. See Rishikof & Perry, supra note 313, at 688–89 (noting the workings of the judicial and 
legislative branches).  
412. See Hartley, supra note 10, at 405–06 (proposing creating “space” for judges to lobby). 
413. See Rishikof & Perry, supra note 313, at 687 (referring to judicial lobbying as “ad hocism”). 
414. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
(2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18176/download [https://perma.cc/H3P8-6JR7]. 
415. Id. 
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proposed legal changes operate.
416
 Because specialized courts often 
operate without checks from other courts, this check on lobbying 
activities would permit review of the lobbying proposals from other 
judges with less personal investment in the outcome. Such oversight is 
likely to check lobbying that could potentially bias a court; such as when 
a court is contemplating commenting on legislation that the court will 
have to review at a later date. Additionally, it would provide increased 
input to specialized courts about the impact of their proposed changes. 
A check on judicial lobbying would also serve as a relevance test for 
specialized courts’ lobbying activities. Oversight will help filter out 
those efforts that have minimal impact on the judiciary.
417
 Conversely, 
for those efforts that the judiciary supports, Congress and the general 
public are likely to view the lobbying effort as representing the views of 
the entire judiciary.
418
 Indeed, oversight of lobbying maintains the 
valuable insight that specialized courts can provide to Congress. When 
the judiciary speaks with one voice, Congress can more confidently rely 
on the assertions of the judicial branch; a confidence that is necessary for 
efficient and productive judicial-congressional dialogue. 
CONCLUSION 
The relationship between the judicial and legislative branches is 
perhaps the most studied inter-branch relationship. The dialogue that 
occurs between judges and congressmen occurs across the formal spaces 
of law-making and opinion-writing, but it also occurs in the informal 
interstices of the modern American political state. Judicial lobbying is a 
vibrant part of our political system and one that is worth maintaining to a 
large degree. Judicial input on statutory and constitutional questions is 
vital at every stage of the law-making process. Encouraging judges to 
provide input to legislators on the functioning of the judicial branch (and 
encouraging congressmen to listen) should be the priority of any 
potential legal or ethical modification to the process of judicial lobbying. 
But judicial lobbying can have deleterious effects on the fairness of 
the adjudicatory process, particularly at specialized courts. Lobbying by 
judges on specialized courts can potentially lead to biased decisions and 
                                                     
416. See FISH, supra note 139, at 330–35. 
417. The Center is governed by the nine-person Board of the Federal Judicial Center. See 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER: ANNUAL REPORT 2013, http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ 
AnnRep13.pdf/$file/AnnRep13.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y893-PZVF]. The Board is a diverse set of 
judicial stakeholders (usually judges) that have a wide variety of interests and concerns. Id. 
418. See Rishikof & Perry, supra note 313, at 687–89 (summarizing judicial lobbying effort as 
“ad hoc”). 
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special interest capture. Therefore, special concern should be paid to 
lobbying efforts that originate from specialized judges. Specialized 
courts face unique bureaucratic pressures that incentivize lobbying by 
judges in ways that are harmful to the legal system.
419
 Judges risk 
appearing biased when reviewing statutes that they have personally 
lobbied against. Ultimately, the United States legal system is benefitted 
when legislators have input from judges, but restrictions on lobbying 
(particularly by specialized judges) are needed. 
                                                     
419. See Dreyfuss, supra note 215, at 5–7 (listing the potential drawbacks to specialized courts). 
